PART I

International Students in the Canadian Context
“International Students Are ... Golden”: Canada’s Changing Policy Contexts, Approaches, and National Peculiarities in Attracting International Students as Future Immigrants

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Introduction

As an international student adviser in the mid- to late 1990s, first at Ryerson University and then at York University, I recollect “dual intent” being among the major issues facing international students (IS) applying for student visas. That is, IS had to prove that they did not intend to both enter the country on a temporary basis and then immigrate permanently. The “burden of proof” was placed on IS to show that they intended to come to Canada only for study purposes and that they would return home after completing their studies. In radical opposition is Canada’s first-ever international education strategy, Harnessing Our Knowledge Advantage to Drive Innovation and Prosperity, released in January 2014, which states:

International students are a future source of skilled labour, as they may be eligible after graduation for permanent residence through immigration programs such as the Canadian Experience Class (introduced in 2008). International students are well positioned to immigrate to Canada as they have typically obtained Canadian credentials, are proficient in at least

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This is an excerpt from a confidential interview. All interviews referenced in this chapter were conducted by Paul Axelrod (principal investigator), Theresa Shanahan, Roopa Desai Trilokekar, and Richard Wellen (co-investigators) for Making Policy in Canadian Post-secondary Education since 1990, a project funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) General Research Grant, 2008–11. The names of the interviewees have been withheld by agreement of both parties. The interview with Bob Rae was not confidential and is quoted with permission.

1 Reference made to first author Roopa Desai Trilokekar.
What triggered such a profound change in the Canadian government’s approach to IS over since the 1990s? How does Canada’s policy compare to those of other OECD countries, which, like Canada, actively recruit IS? This chapter examines the changing international education (IE) policy context and approaches to IS in Canada via a historical policy analysis to ascertain if and how Canadian policy either converges or diverges from global trends, or if it is the result of the formation of a hybrid policy.

Viewed against the backdrop of demographic challenges and economic restraints, there has been growing policy attention from advanced economies to the recruitment and retention of IS as part of a broad strategy to manage highly skilled migration (Becker and Kolster 2012; OECD 2015; Riaño and Piguet 2016; She and Wotherspoon 2013). Several OECD countries are “engaged in marketing their higher education institutions, easing entry and status extension regulations, allowing IS to work during studies, and offering channels for them to change status and stay as knowledge workers” (She and Wotherspoon 2013, 2). With more intense and complex competition among these countries for IS, there has been a resulting trend of both policy convergence and divergence, with key national factors determining the shape of each government’s IS policy (Chaloff and Lemaître 2009; Choudaha, Li, and Kono 2013; Santiago et al. 2008; Suter and Jandl 2006; Tremblay 2005). Researchers note the importance of examining the various factors that shape government policies (see Ortiz, Chang, and Fang 2015; Riaño and Piguet 2016; She and Wotherspoon 2013). This chapter aims to compliment those studies that focus on national government policies on IS recruitment and retention.

**International Students, Globalization, and the Internationalization of Higher Education**

In the present context, internationalization is the “process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of higher education at the institutional and national levels” (Knight 2008, 21). IS “are defined as non-Canadian students who do not have ‘permanent resident’ status and have had to obtain the authorization of the Canadian government [typically a student visa] to enter Canada with the intention of pursuing an education”
The hosting of international students is associated with institutional strategies for internationalization. Universities Canada's internationalization survey reports that 45 per cent of responding Canadian institutions identified the recruitment of IS as among their highest priorities, and 70 per cent included IS recruitment among their top five goals (AUCC 2014). Whereas Canadian universities acknowledge the value of IS in internationalizing their campuses, they also cite the revenue these students generate (AUCC 2014). Due to a decline in public funding, cash-deprived universities “are looking for revenues from all sources … and international students do help us do that” (Chignal 2015).

Internationalization is thus considered “one of the major forces impacting and shaping higher education in the 21st century,” (Knight 2008, ix). Altbach, Reisberg, and Rumbley state that

Globalization, a key reality in the 21st century, has already profoundly influenced higher education … We define globalization as the reality shaped by an increasingly integrated world economy, new information and communications technology, the emergence of an international knowledge network, the role of the English language, and other forces beyond the control of academic institutions (2009, 7).

Clearly, both internationalization and globalization are seen as critical forces shaping higher education in the twenty-first century. Sometimes considered distinct yet interrelated, globalization and internationalization are more often than not used interchangeably to signify neo-liberal policy changes aimed at restructuring national higher education systems to secure a greater share of the global educational market (Currie and Newson 1998; Dolby 2011; Enders and Fulton 2002; Stromquist 2013; Wells 2005). Recruitment of IS is one such policy and practice adopted by nation states to meet these objectives (Altbach and Knight 2007; Dennison and Schuette 2004; Dolby 2011; Marginson 2011; Rizvi 2011; Trilokekar and Kizilbash 2013).

In fact, it is suggested that national governments have developed a wide range of “more advanced or even highly sophisticated strategies” to both recruit and retain IS (Becker and Kolster 2012, 52). OECD countries are reported to attract over 70 per cent of all IS, with Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States...
together receiving more than 50 per cent of all IS worldwide (OECD 2015). Depending on the actual number of IS they host and their overall recruitment and retention policies, countries have been categorized as “major players” (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia); “middle powers” (Germany and France); “evolving destinations” (Japan, Canada, and New Zealand); and “emerging contenders” (Malaysia, Singapore, and China) (Verbik and Lasanowski 2007). Canada ranks as the world’s seventh most popular destination for IS (CBIE 2016; ICEF 2013) and it holds a 5 per cent share of the global market for internationally mobile students (ICEF 2013). Becker and Kolster (2012) report on how these national IS policies are increasingly aligned with national economic strategies and foreign economic and cultural policies “focusing on increasing a country’s international economic competitiveness by investing in knowledge, innovation and a highly-skilled workforce” (52). However, there are differentials in policy focus. The United Kingdom and Australia, for example, aim to recruit IS who can pay higher tuition fees because income from these fees accounts for a large proportion of many institutions’ revenues. Hence, the United Kingdom and Australia are noted for their aggressive recruitment practices, which have resulted in the strongest growth in international undergraduate students (Choudaha et. al. 2013). On the other hand, countries such as Germany and Canada, given their declining or low birth rates and aging populations, are noted for attracting IS in an effort to address future labour market shortages and to boost the future national economy (Becker and Kolster 2012). Australia has witnessed a shift in its immigration policies to the extent that IS are now also viewed as a potential pool of qualified immigrants. Hence, IS are increasingly viewed as “ideal,” “home-grown” alternatives to other immigrants (Gribble and Blackmore 2012; Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b; Johnstone and Lee 2014; Lowe 2010; Sá and Sabzalieva 2016). With better language skills and significantly more acculturation in host countries, they are considered an “attractive and efficient resource,” as they are of “prime work-force age and have self-funded to meet domestic employer requirements” (Hawthorne 2012, 422). A similar rationale supports government policy across several countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland, to name just a few (de Wit 2011; Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b; Morris-Lange and Brands 2015; Sá and Sabzalieva 2016).

As countries acknowledge the risks associated with “uncontrollable and destabilizing migration flows,” they develop “migration management” strategies to “both strictly control human mobility and organize it in a way that makes it compatible with a number of objectives pursued by both
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state and non-state actors” (Pécoud 2013, 1). Beine et al. (2015) note an emerging policy trend that separates high-skilled labour immigration (e.g., IS) from unwanted labour migration. As mentioned above, with several OECD countries facing similar demographic challenges, the new immigration pathway for IS as a way of addressing a country’s immediate and projected labour market shortages has gained popularity (Becker and Kolster 2012; de Wit 2011; Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b; Riaño and Piguet 2016; She and Wotherspoon 2013; She 2011; Tremblay 2005). Riaño and Piguet (2016) report that IS are the fastest-growing immigrant group among all groups of migrants, including labour migrants, family migrants, and refugees. However, scholars indicate that countries differ in their overall approach to IS policies. Some are characterized by their “closed policy” approach – which is “legitimized, for example, by security issues as well as the fear that foreign students might crowd out natives from graduate programs and ultimately become competitors in the labour market” – while others exhibit more “open policy” approaches, which seek to “increase the number of highly skilled workers but also follow the idea that student migration is correlated with entrepreneurship, international trade, and investment” (Riaño and Piguet 2016, 17). For example, She and Wotherspoon (2013) suggest that the United States is inclined to have low openness to IS entry and high control on their settlement whereas Canada tends to act in the opposite way – that is, high openness to entry and low control on stay. Hence, scholars suggest that despite the overall convergence in IS policies across host countries, the detailed regulations, procedures, and mechanisms through which these policies are carried out differ from one country to another (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004).

Approach: Framework and Outline

We define policy as “any course of action (or inaction) relating to the selection of goals, the definition of values, or the allocation of resources” (Codd 1988, 235). To investigate how Canada’s federal policy on IS and IE has been constructed and framed we adopt Gale’s (2001) historiography methodological approach to policy analysis. Policy historiography is interested in tracing policy changes and the way those changes are addressed within a particular policy domain; exploring policies in their current form; and examining the nature of the change from earlier policies to the current one. When studying the construction of policy and its changes over time, it is important to remember that “policy documents … are ideological texts that have been constructed within a particular
context. The task of deconstruction begins with the recognition of that context” (Codd 1988, 243–4). This approach aids us in “highlight[ing] how policies come to be framed in certain ways – reflecting how economic, social, political and cultural contexts shape both the content and language of policy documents” (Taylor 1997, 28).

This chapter is divided into three sections. First, in keeping with Gale’s (2001) approach to policy historiography, we start by examining the conditions and specific contexts (historical, economic, and political) that have led to the emergence of particular IE policy agendas and approaches. Focusing on the federal government, this chapter first analyzes how and to what end the state shapes such policies. We then examine whether global forces cause the state to reproduce global policy rhetoric as a “product of conscious adaptation, blind imitation or pressure to conform” (Stromquist quoted in Wells 2005, 110). Finally, in concerning itself with the effects or implications of federal policy at the national, provincial, and institutional levels, this chapter adopts a layered approach to understanding policy (Taylor 1997), engaging with what Marginson and Rhoades (2002) refer to as the “gloconal,” or, as Marginson and Sawir (2005) explain, how IS and IE policy get taken up and constituted “by an amalgam of global, national and local factors in complex ways” (289) to produce specific practices and policies within a given context. This chapter thus attempts to address policy discourse through its core aspects: contexts, texts, and consequences (Taylor 1997).

**Historical Development of Federal Policy on IS**

Bond and Lemasson (1999) suggest that the two major formative strands of internationalization in Canadian universities are development cooperation and IS. The enrolment of IS at Canadian universities first began as part of Canada’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) program. During the 1960s, IS came mainly from the developing world and they arrived with funding, including scholarships such as the Canadian Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Program (CSFP). Beginning in the 1980s, however, there was a radical shift in government policy towards IS. This shift was evident in the third volume of the 1984 Commission on Canadian Studies report, *Some Questions of Balance: Human Resources, Higher Education and Canadian Studies*, which expressed concern over the fact that Canadians were spending approximately $300 million of their tax dollars on the education of IS in Canada (excluding fees). There was a growing sentiment during this period that IS should not be educated at the expense of Canadian taxpayers (DFAIT 1988,
In 1982–3, an estimated 65,000 IS were studying in Canada, 35,000 of them at universities. An outcome of this report was a complete shift to a fee-paying model for IS, with most provinces charging differential fees, though some had already initiated this prior to the report as early as the late 1970s (Canadian Federation of Students 2015).

This shift towards attracting more fee-paying IS, which was likely a result of an increase in “nationalistic” or “parochial” thinking on the part of the government, was also directly tied to the increased emphasis on an economic agenda in Canada’s foreign policy. Beginning in the 1980s, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) highlighted the priority given to international trade in Canada’s foreign policy. Within the context of an “international market place,” Canadian higher education began to be viewed as a commodity (Joyal 1994, 6), and IS and IE were perceived as important mechanisms to secure Canada’s national prosperity. In the late 1980s, a staff position was added to DFAIT for the exclusive purpose of “marketing … educational services” (DFAIT 1988, 3), with Minister of International Trade Sergio Marchi proclaiming, “Education is now an industry. Canada needs to approach the international market place for education services with the same discipline and commitment that we bring to other sectors” (Trilokekar 2007, 225). There was a direct policy link between IS recruitment, IE, and international trade. IS and IE became increasingly valuable in terms of their dollar contributions to the economy. For example, Jim Fox, president of the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) stated that, “for Canada, educational trade amounts to $1.5 billion. This relates to international students alone … Education, in fact, ranks as an export that is next to wheat in its importance to this country” (quoted in Joyal 1994, 19). By 1992, with Canadian universities now hosting 37,000 foreign students, the focus turned to substantially increasing IS numbers. Team Canada Missions abroad came to include university presidents, and in 1995, the first eight Canada Education Centres were established to market Canadian higher education. In 1998, a new Educational Marketing Unit was established within DFAIT and assigned the task of brand development for Canadian education abroad (Trilokekar 2007).

Another shift in IS policy was introduced with the release of Canada’s Innovation Strategy in 2002. Having previously focused exclusively on recruiting IS, the government was now committed to attracting them as future immigrants. The new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) of 2001 put in place a series of measures that essentially enabled the retention of IS beyond their formal period of study – namely by establishing a new category of temporary residents, thereby allowing IS
to more easily pursue study and/or work opportunities in Canada. In 2004, a pilot off-campus work project for IS was established, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) began partnering directly with the post-secondary sector in programs such as the Student Partners Project in 2005 to further streamline and facilitate IS entry to Canada and their application for permanent residency.

This new push to attract IS as permanent residents resulted in further government investments in IS recruitment strategies. Advantage Canada, released in 2006 as Canada’s economic action plan, explicitly stated that Canada’s knowledge advantage was to be achieved by marketing higher education abroad and attracting the “best” foreign students to Canada. Also in 2006, DFAIT announced Edu-Canada, a new initiative aimed at promoting Canada as an educational destination. An investment of $1 million per year over five years was allocated to launch the Imagine Education in/au Canada brand and an associated marketing campaign. In 2008, the Global Commerce Strategy provided a further investment of $2 million for educational marketing. That same year, the off-campus work permit program was formally launched and a novel immigration category introduced, the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), which enabled temporary foreign workers, including IS with Canadian work experience, to apply for permanent residency (CIC 2010). The introduction of the CEC marked the start of an even more targeted approach to the wooing of IS as future permanent residents. By 2009, IS were able to extend their post-graduation work permits for to up to three years.

The government’s attempt to invest in recruiting more IS was further legitimized by the resulting economic returns. Two government-commissioned reports, Economic Impact of International Education in Canada and Best Practices on Managing the Delivery of Canadian Education Marketing, both published in 2009, emphasized the economic advantage of hosting IS. The two reports also positioned Canada competitively in their assessment of global IS recruitment and retention best practices. In 2010, an updated version of Economic Impact of International Education in Canada estimated even higher economic benefits to Canada from the increase in IS, stating that IS spent in excess of $7.7 billion on tuition, accommodation, and discretionary spending; created over 81,000 jobs; and generated more than $445 million in government revenue (Kunin and Associates 2012). With such data-driven evidence of the direct – and increasing – economic value of IS, the government legitimized not only its policy discourse but also its power in shaping IS policy to meet its broader national (economic) objectives. IE and IS were now central to the government’s economic plans. Not only did the government’s 2011
Economic Action Plan allocate funding for the development of an IE strategy, but the 2013 Global Markets Action Plan 1 also identified IE as one of the Canadian economy’s twenty-two priority sectors.

In 2014, Minister of International Trade Ed Fast announced Canada’s first-ever IE strategy by stating that “international education is critical to Canada’s success … International education is at the very heart of our current and future prosperity” (DFATD 2014, 4). The contributions of IS to the Canadian economy were estimated to be $8.5 billion, with the creation of over 86,570 jobs in addition to more than $455 million in generated tax revenues (DFATD 2014). The strategy’s goals include doubling IS numbers in Canada by 2022 and “increasing the number of international students choosing to remain in Canada as Permanent Residents after graduation” (DFATD 2014, 17). By 2014, IE had become synonymous with recruiting more IS. In the words of one interviewee, there was “really strong recognition … that international students are actually golden, because they are the ones who will go in, get a Canadian education, and be ready for a Canadian workforce experience” (Personal Interview, 18 May 2011; emphasis added).

To facilitate this policy imperative, CIC started issuing IS study permits with automatic off-campus work authorization as of June 2014. On 1 January 2015, however, CIC introduced the Express Entry program, a new electronic application management system that places IS immigration applications alongside other rank-ordered immigrants (CIC 2015). This change in the processing of immigration applications has initiated a debate as to whether it “hinders [IS] access to permanent residency instead of promoting it” (Keung 2015, para. 1), and if in fact it contradicts one of the main “selling features for Canada’s international education” – that is, “the opportunity for foreign students to immigrate and stay in Canada after earning their Canadian experience” (Keung 2015, para. 21–2). The new Express Entry program reflects the Canadian government’s more targeted approach to immigration as a way to address the needs of the Canadian labour market. Whereas IS, given their personal and educational attributes and their potential to contribute positively to the Canadian labour market, are still envisioned as a valuable pool of talent, the new program favours immigration applicants, including IS, who have job offers supported by a Labour Market Impact Assessment or provincial/territorial nomination, and who can thus immediately contribute to the labour market and the broader economy.3

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3 Express Entry is an electronic application management system that applies to most of the immigration routes: Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP); Federal Skilled Trades Program (FSTP); Canadian Experience Class (CEC); and a portion of the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) (CIC 2015). Under the new Express Entry system (introduced
A summary of the policy changes made during the 2002–15 period that enabled the federal government to meet its dual interest of recruiting IS and retaining them as permanent residents is provided in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 CIC International Student Policy Changes, 2002–15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy/Program</th>
<th>Description of Changes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)</td>
<td>Waived the study permit requirement for IS registered in a short-term course or program of six months or less.</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>Study Permit (SP)</td>
<td>Streamlined the SP application process, enabling IS to obtain an SP valid for the full length of their intended period of study, and those in post-secondary studies to transfer between programs of study and institutions (public and private) without first making an application to CIC.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Post-Graduation Work Permit (PGWP) Program</td>
<td>Enabled IS graduates from recognized Canadian educational institutions outside Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver to work after graduation in Canada for an additional year (up to a total of two years).</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Off-Campus Work Permit (OCWP) Program</td>
<td>Enabled full-time IS at participating educational institutions to work off campus during their studies for up to twenty hours per week.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>PGWP Program</td>
<td>Allowed IS to obtain an open work permit (for up to three years), with no restrictions on the type of employment and no requirement of a job offer.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Online Applications</td>
<td>Enabled IS in Canada to apply online for an off-campus work permit.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Canadian Experience Class (CEC)</td>
<td>Introduced a new immigration stream that allows IS graduates with professional, managerial, and skilled work experience to immigrate, recognizing their education and work experience in Canada as key selection criteria for permanent residence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>OCWP</td>
<td>Enabled IS to apply for OCWP processing through online applications.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provincial Nominee Program (PNP)</td>
<td>Introduced the International Student Category to facilitate IS conversion under provincial nomination targets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Policy/Program</td>
<td>Description of Changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>International Student Program (ISP)</td>
<td>Enabled IS to stay in Canada for up to three years following graduation, giving them more time to gain Canadian work experience prior to applying for permanent residency. Reduced Canadian work experience requirement for residency from twenty-four to twelve months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Limited the issuance of study permits to applicants who will be studying at a designated learning institution. Required students to actively pursue their studies while in Canada Allowed full-time IS enrolled at designated institutions in certain programs to work part-time off campus and full-time during scheduled school breaks without a work permit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Express Entry</td>
<td>Introduced the Express Entry program as a new electronic application management system that applies to most of the immigration routes: Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP); Federal Skilled Trades Program (FSTP); Canadian Experience Class (CEC); and a portion of the Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) IS with secured job offers from a Canadian employer are favoured; however, they do not get extra points for their education in Canada.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Express Entry (amendments)</td>
<td>Introduced amendments to Express Entry according to which IS are advantaged by earning extra points for their education in Canada. Points depend on the duration of the program that the IS is enrolled in (IS enrolled in programs that last three years or longer earn more points than those whose program duration is one to two years).</td>
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Note: sections of this table adapted from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010.
**Canada in the Context of International Trends**

While, as noted above, the federal government has been engaged in IS and IE policy, a distinctive feature of the Canadian case is that, unlike other international jurisdictions, formal policy and funding allocations for IS recruitment in Canada emerged primarily at the provincial level rather than at the national level (Shubert, Jones, and Trilokekar 2009). Canada’s unique federal structure, in which education is solely a provincial responsibility, is partly the reason for this anomaly. Given the jurisdictional divide, Canadian provinces have historically resisted federal initiatives deemed “educational,” including the development of any national IS policy (Allison 1999; Trilokekar 2007). In 2006, when the federal government attempted to establish an educational brand for Canada, there was tremendous pushback from the provinces, who felt that education did not fall under federal jurisdiction, and that the provinces should represent Canadian education nationally (Trilokekar 2007). Provincial sentiment against formal recognition of any federal role in education was so strong that the Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC4) participated only as an observer at DFAIT meetings, refusing to engage as a provincial representative with the federal government on education-related matters (Trilokekar 2007, 2009). In fact, several provinces had established IE policies long before the launch of the federal government’s strategy, and Canadian universities have been at the forefront of IS recruitment strategies, some even investing far more via budget allocations for IS recruitment than the federal government (DFAIT 2012).

With an increased sense of global competition, however, these traditional policy dichotomies seem to have changed. For example, in the Government of Ontario’s *Rae Report*, the province made a call for greater collaboration with other partners, including the federal government, to present “the whole [education] sector to the world” (Ontario 2005, 11). Similarly, in its 2011 IE marketing plan, the CMEC recognized that a multilaterally coordinated government action to promote

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4 The CMEC is an intergovernmental body founded in 1967 by the provincial ministers of education to provide leadership in education at the pan-Canadian and international levels.

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on 1 January 2015), IS immigration applications are processed and ranked alongside other immigrants using the Comprehensive Ranking System (CRS), which is “a scoring mechanism tied to best predictors of economic success.” For more details, see: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/Express_Entry_Technical_Briefing.pdf
its education systems abroad would benefit all stakeholders; it therefore addressed the need to work in partnership with the federal government, even “call[ing] upon the federal government to exercise greater leadership in this area” (Council of the Federation Secretariat 2011, 10) – an extraordinary move within the context of Canadian higher education. The provinces came together under the auspices of the CMEC in 2011 to advance their first collaborative international education marketing plan (Council of the Federation Secretariat 2011; DFATD 2012). This culminated with the publication of federal government’s first-ever formal IE policy in 2014, *Harnessing Our Knowledge Advantage to Drive Innovation and Prosperity*.

As most provincial policies have identified the recruitment and retention of IS as their top priority, it was essential for the provinces to work in close cooperation with the federal government to enhance the retention of IS as permanent residents. Thus, over time there has been greater policy alignment and coordination between the provincial and federal governments on IS policy. As Guhr, Mondino, and Lundberg (2011) rightly observe, “the shifting demographic balance and current and predicted labour market challenges across Canada’s provinces result in close alignment of economic and immigration policy between the provinces and the provincial and federal governments” (68). Furthermore, the provinces are equally concerned with “retaining more of the talented students who come to Canada to study … through developing more integrated use of the PNPs [Provincial Nominee Programs] and of innovative initiatives under immigration agreements” (Council of the Federation Secretariat 2011, 17).

IE and IS policies in Canada thus exhibit trends that diverge from those in other international jurisdictions. For example, both the UK and Australian governments invested large sums of money in national-level recruitment initiatives resulting in aggressive strategies both at the national and institutional levels (Ortiz, Chang, and Fang 2015, Trilokekar and Kizilbash 2013). Countries like France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany have a well-developed national infrastructure for promoting IS cultural and educational exchanges. Unlike these countries, Canada did not develop a top-down approach; that is, the federal government was not the first to initiate a policy, which then had subsequent implications/impact at the provincial and

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5 PNPs are provincially run immigration streams. Provinces and territories may recruit immigrants under an agreement with the federal government.
institutional levels. Rather, the institutional, provincial, and federal policy approaches have worked mostly independently, though at times there has been some cooperation. Canada’s overarching approach to IS does, however, exhibit many overlaps with global trends. The title of the 2010 World Education Services (WES)\textsuperscript{6} symposium – International Students: The New Skilled Migrants – speaks to the study-migration pathway as a growing global phenomenon (Lowe 2010). Contributing to this need for an educated labour force is the new global knowledge economy, in which “a nation’s ‘knowledge advantage’ in cultivating a well-educated, highly skilled and flexible workforce has been recognized as the most critical asset for economic prosperity” (She and Wotherspoon 2013, 1). Germany has recently made a dramatic shift in immigration policy, and is now promoting a “culture of remaining” (Morris-Lange and Brands 2015, 44); indeed, Germany now has some of the most liberal IS transition policies in the world. It not only offers tuition-free higher education to IS, it also provides excellent examples of expanding post-study work/residency options, non-restrictive labour regulations, and pilot initiatives supporting the transition and entry of IS into the labour market (Morris-Lange and Brands 2015). Along with New Zealand, France, and Japan, Germany’s increasingly competitive approach to IS recruitment is resulting in a diminishing global market share for the four key players – the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (Choudaha, Li, and Kono 2013).

Canada recognizes this heightened international competition for the same pool of highly educated and skilled potential immigrants. It is partly in response to this increased sense of global competition that the federal and provincial governments are addressing the need for national approaches, a unique occurrence in the Canadian context. The rhetoric adopted by the Canadian government speaks to its desire to attract and retain “top talent” to address the skilled labour shortage, which is becoming “desperate, [thereby] threatening our ability to keep up in a global, knowledge-based economy” (DFATD 2014, 9). This is in keeping with the rhetoric used by other countries, which alludes to a “global race for talent” in a “global knowledge/talent war” (Douglas and Edelstein 2009; Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b; She and Wotherspoon 2013; Wildavsky 2010; Ziguras and Law 2006). This sense of global competition is perhaps most clearly captured in the following statement:

\textsuperscript{6} WES is a non-profit international education organization specializing in international credential evaluation services. It hosted the referenced conference in November 2010.
You don’t compare yourself to the guy down the street. You’ve got to say, “Who’s doing this best anywhere in the world, and how do we match that?” That’s got to be the new standard … The basis of the comparison has to be, “Is Canada doing as good of a job as Australia and the Brits?” If not, why not and how do we improve? Who’s doing it best? (Interview with Bob Rae, 27 May 2011)

Despite the increased number of IS in Canada, the federal government argues that, as a relatively late starter in the race for IS recruitment and retention, Canada needs to more aggressively “seize [its] share” (DFAIT 2012, xii) of the market. Through a “robust international education strategy,” the Canadian government therefore aims to “seiz[e] the moment” by ensuring that a good proportion of the 6.4 million IS expected by 2025 are attracted to study in Canada (DFATD 2014, 9). As a result of this approach, Canada hosted 353,000 IS in 2015 – a 92 per cent increase since 2008 (CBIE 2016). In the spirit of competition, the Government of Canada claims to take advantage of the decreased share of the international student market of countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom (She and Wotherspoon 2013) and the dysfunctional US immigration system (Burgmann 2014). As Jason Kenney, former federal employment minister, stated, “Stalled immigration reforms in the United States are an opportunity for Canada to scoop up a wealth of young, ‘brilliant’ foreign nationals and direct them into burgeoning tech-sector employment … We’re seeking very deliberately to benefit from the dysfunctional American immigration system. I make no bones about it” (Quoted in Burgmann 2014, paras. 1 and 3). Such aggressive and highly competitive rhetoric is not common within the Canadian context, but it is very much in keeping with the global concern that countries can no longer take increased inflows of IS for granted and the sense that most nations have to be making continuous efforts to better and more competitively recruit, attract, and support IS (Becker and Kolster 2012). In the case of Canada, the argument that policy convergence is determined by forces of globalization may seem convincing. However, we argue that a closer examination of the historical, economic, and political context suggests that the forces of globalization are not deterministic, but rather reflect a conscious choice on the part of the state. Canadian government policymakers borrow selectively from the global policy discourse to suit the specifics of the Canadian context, adapting things to protect their own interests (Wells 2005, 111). We elaborate our position further in the next section.
Discussion

This chapter set out to examine the changing IE policy context and approaches to IS in Canada via a historical policy analysis to ascertain whether Canadian policy converges, diverges, and/or represents a hybrid policy formation in relation to global trends.

In reviewing the federal government’s approach to IE and IS recruitment over time, we noted a considerable shift over the 1960–2015 period (Table 2.2). During this time, Canada’s policy orientation shifted from an outward focus on IE as an instrument to strengthen Canada’s place in the world and its relationships with the international community to an inward focus where IE became an instrument to meet national and local economic and human capital needs. Below is a brief synopsis of these changing policy directions.

Table 2.2 Summary of Federal IE and IS Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Policy Driver</th>
<th>Policy Direction</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s–1970s</td>
<td>Post–Second World War Period</td>
<td>Overseas Development Assistance program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post–Second World War Period</td>
<td>Funding IS to study in Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post–Second World War Period</td>
<td>Soft power/cultural diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Domestication of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Linking IE and IS recruitment with international trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestication of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Priority to benefits for Canadian economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestication of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Expanding fee-paying model for IS across Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>International Trade as Foreign Policy</td>
<td>IE marketization and branding initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Trade as Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Education as international trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Trade as Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Intensifying IS recruitment initiatives; IS immigration friendly policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Domestic Labour Market and Immigration Needs</td>
<td>IS immigration-friendly policies to retain as future immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Labour Market and Immigration Needs</td>
<td>IE/IS as both revenue generation venue and human capital pool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domestic Labour Market and Immigration Needs</td>
<td>Branding Canadian education abroad, increased IS recruitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
assistance; the second phase also approached IS recruitment in terms of foreign policy, as it related to projecting the Canadian image abroad and meeting Canadian domestic interests. In the third phase, IS policy was again framed as a matter of foreign policy, in this case primarily dictated by international trade priorities, while in the fourth phase, IS policy was not shaped by foreign policy, but by immigration policy and human resource/labour market imperatives.

Are these four distinctive policy orientations simply reflective of global trends?

Canada’s initial IS policy was directly linked with its post–Second World War foreign policy. Identifying as a middle power, Canada was committed to world peace and “humane internationalism” – that is, “an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty” (Morrison 1998, 2). This foreign policy translated into investments in international development assistance, which led Canada to be identified as “one of the more generous donors among industrialized countries” (Morrison 1998, 1). Canada’s interest in IS in the 1960s and 1970s had to do primarily with training and developing the infrastructure and human resource base of the developing world. Indeed, as Dolby (2011) suggests, this was a period when internationalization paradigms were anchored in principles of humanitarianism and the fostering of world peace and international cooperation. To this end, several Western countries embarked on IE exchange programs, with the United States’ flagship Fulbright and Peace Corps programs and Germany’s large-scale investments in cultural and educational diplomacy serving as prime examples (Trilokekar 2007). While the Canadian approach was certainly well within this international ethos, the country nonetheless positioned itself as a “non-colonial” middle power distinct from countries such as the United States or Britain (Trilokekar 2010). This positioning translated into a particular policy discourse that legitimized the federal government’s role in IE in a way that was distinct from that of other Western nations. For example, the United States centred its policy rhetoric around national security in the Cold War period (Ruther 2002, 60), and Germany focused on building trust and regaining its position in the post-Nazi period (Trilokekar 2007). Canada, by contrast, did not have same global political agenda.

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7 Canada’s Commonwealth ties influence its preference for specific countries.
during this period, hence it did not invest in international education as a form of international diplomacy.

In the 1970s, however Canada’s policy rationale for hosting IS shifted dramatically, paralleling a major transition in Canadian foreign policy. The impetus for Canada to “domesticate” its foreign policy resulted from a need to differentiate itself from its powerful US neighbour and concentrate on serving Canadian interests (Trilokekar 2007). We would argue that this policy shift was largely a result of regional geopolitics – specifically, Canada’s fear of over-reliance on the United States for its economic development, as well as its social and cultural capital (Wright 2004). The policy shift enacted in this period opened Canada’s doors to new markets in the Asia-Pacific region, which in turn drew policymakers’ attention to Australia’s highly successful policy outreach approaches within the region. These new priorities ultimately pushed the Canadian government to make what we note as a third shift in policy.

This shift was most visible in the 1980s with the amalgamation into a single body of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the federal government’s exclusive focus on promoting trade as the most crucial element of Canada’s foreign policy. With this emphasis on trade, such rhetoric as “education is trade” received immediate support from the federal government. The ultimate test of this new policy orientation was a shift in Canada’s International Development Assistance program, whereby the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) began funding Canadian Education Centres in developing countries to “market [Canadian] educational products and services” (Trilokekar 2007, 224). In many ways, this IE-as-trade and IS-as-commodity discourse could be considered international in scope. In the 1990s, this discourse was legitimized when the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) included a discussion on education. For Canada, however, Australia’s tremendous success in recruiting IS was of particular interest and served as an excellent policy rationale for its own strategic approach. The Government of Canada recognizes the many similarities between the two countries (Trilokekar and Kizilbash 2013) and sees the Asia-Pacific region, where Australia’s IS recruitment efforts has been most active, as a lucrative market for Canadian educational services.

These global trends, while influencing Canadian policy, did not force the Canadian government into “blind imitation or pressure to conform.” Rather, we argue, they enabled the Canadian government to legitimize a policy orientation that had already taken form within its foreign policy. The government’s approach was much more reflective of a “conscious
adaptation” (Stromquist quoted in Wells 2005, 110) or a strategic choice to engage the global policy discourse to maximize its own policy agenda.

To make our case, we refer to the Australian context, where the implementation of high differential tuition fees for IS and the resultant push to increase the recruitment and enrolment of IS was a direct result of a shift in domestic educational policy – namely the Jackson and Dawkins policy reforms – which in turn steered Australian universities to a set of market-like behaviours (Trilokekar and Kizilbash 2013). IS recruitment was a by-product of these policy shifts, although the Australian government did provide universities with several direct incentives to further develop IE promotional and marketing activities. The Canadian context was different. IS recruitment was initiated by the federal government primarily as an international trade activity; however, given its restricted jurisdictional authority on educational matters, the Canadian government was not in a position to announce a formalized IE strategy, nor was able to directly steer institutional policy approaches and outcomes. Rather, it had to battle with the provinces to establish its legitimacy in the arena of education policy. So while on the surface, the Canadian and Australian policy approaches may seem similar, their respective contexts in which they were developed created differences in the location, rate, and nature of their impact on the higher education sector. We therefore concur with Marginson and Sawir (2005) when they suggest that while tendencies to converge are obvious, when we look more closely for difference as well as similarity we find the global transformations are not identical by time and place. Rather, they are constituted in each place by an amalgam of global, national and local factors in complex ways. (289)

At the provincial level, one could argue that there is increased alignment between government policy and commonly associated globalization practices – namely decreased public-sector funding, increased marketization, greater accountability, and the establishment of an audit culture (Dolby 2011). However, even at the provincial level, these policies have been adopted in local contexts. For example, Quebec’s IS policy differentiates between francophone and non-francophone IS, so that francophone IS from select countries are exempt from paying the IS fee differential (Picard and Mills 2009). Such a strategy is clearly in keeping with Quebec’s international relations and cultural policies, and is not based on a purely economic rationale. Similarly, Newfoundland and Labrador has frozen IS fees (as well as domestic tuition) and, given
its specific local challenges, has “decided to swim against the nationwide tide” (Taber 2013). These specific cases lend further credence to Marginson’s and Rhoades’s (2002) “gloconal” heuristic, which argues that the global, local, and national flows are “simultaneous and multidimensional” (Dolby 2011, 4).

The fourth shift in IS policy orientation is linked to broader national economic returns, as the former Ontario premier notes:

[International education] is not just about education. This is about the economy, immigration, our innovation, and our overall capacity to succeed as an economy. So it isn’t just about education. (Interview with Bob Rae, 27 May 2011)

This policy discourse continues the earlier narrative on IE as an important national economic strategy, given that IS bring in large revenues to the host country; indeed, it extends it further. IS are important in terms of both their short- and long-term contributions to the economy, first as fee-paying IS, then as workers in the labour market, and then as employed, tax-paying permanent residents. IS and IE are framed as being critical to “Canada’s success” and “long-term economic security,” and as contributing to “a more prosperous, more innovative, and more competitive Canada” (DFATD 2014, 4). This policy orientation in many ways marks a radical shift from Canada’s ideological stance in the 1960s of building expert knowledge within developing countries and restricting the so-called brain drain of talent from the developed world, to one that aggressively seeks to attract talent (brain gain) from these very same countries. With the current policy discourse, the government has steered away from terms such as “brain drain,” adopting instead the terminology of “brain circulation” or the “global race for talent” to legitimize its particular policy approach.

The global policy rhetoric on the knowledge economy and its revalidation of human capital theory has certainly been brought to bear on the Canadian government’s policy discourse, in a way that is similar to several other countries. However, the framing of IS policy as an immediate domestic imperative holds a lot more currency in the Canadian context. We propose that this precise interest in IS as future permanent residents to meet domestic labour market needs, given Canada’s aging population and increasing dependence on immigration, served as the primary policy lever for the Harper government to launch its first IE strategy. No
Canadian government before had declared a federal IE strategy, despite an interest in recruiting IS.

We identify specific national contexts that enable the IS-as-new-immigrants policy direction. First, Canada is expressly reliant on immigration to meet its labour market/economic needs. It is one of the few countries where immigration is expected to count for 100 per cent of net workforce growth (DFATD 2014; Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b). Second, Canada already has an immigration policy that gives preference to those entering through the economic pathway (62 per cent). The emphasis placed on economic immigration and a traditional foreign policy focus on international trade creates a policy environment within Canada where the different policy discourses – IE, foreign policy, and immigration – reinforce one another, creating a powerful, convergent, and seemingly normative policy discourse on IS.

Canada’s past challenges in integrating new immigrants into its labour force serves as a third factor supporting the IS-as-new-immigrants policy. In Canada, there has been concern over the reliance on economic immigrants given that their credentials and work experience are often not recognized in the Canadian labour market, resulting in subsequent loss of revenue and poor economic impact on Canadian society (Hawthorne 2008a, 2008b; Reitz 2005). In addition, the notion of attracting the “right” people has been an object of constant debate in Canadian immigration policy (Li 2003). Given this context, a policy that profiles IS as ideal immigrants who have proven their “economic worth” by paying high IS fees and spending on housing, food, transportation, and travel (Abu-Laban 1988 quoted in Sakamoto et.al 2013, 6), earning Canadian credentials, developing proficiency in at least one official language, and building familiarity with Canadian social customs and Canadian work experience is one that holds merit at both the federal and provincial levels. IS as Simmons’s “ideal” or “designer immigrants” (quoted in Chira 2013, 7) are easily accepted as “home-grown,” and therefore a “palatable option” (Hawthorne 2012, 432). They represent a low financial risk/burden for government and are therefore seen as an efficient, cost-effective means to meet immigration targets. In addition, as a group that has self-funded their education to meet Canadian employer requirements (Hawthorne 2012, 422), IS are considered a “prized … human capital resource” (Hawthorne 2012, 417). The framing of IE/IS policy as linked to the labour market and immigration also serves to further legitimize the role of the federal government, given that the labour market
and immigration (unlike education) are commonly accepted to be federal responsibilities.

Using a US example, we make our final point to illustrate Canada’s unique context and approach. The United States is often recognized as a country that originally spearheaded the acquisition of global talent (Hawthorne 2010; 2008a, 2008b). Its approach has been to enroll mostly graduate-level IS in the engineering and science disciplines, a rationale linked directly to its innovation and research agendas (Tremblay 2005). A similar trend has been followed by countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, who also put a strong emphasis on the recruitment of IS at the master’s and doctoral levels, some through a wide range of national government scholarships targeted at these levels of study (Becker and Kolster 2012). In particular, several countries – including the four listed above – strongly emphasize the recruitment of IS in the STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) fields. In fact, the United Kingdom is noted to have had 13.7 per cent annual growth in the number of international graduate students in STEM (She and Wotherspoon 2013). IS are considered a vital source of enrollments for these fields in the United States, with more than one in three IS enrolled in a STEM field (Ortiz, Chang, and Fang 2015). Canada’s approach has focused primarily on the recruitment of fee-paying undergraduate students, not necessarily concentrated in STEM. This recruitment strategy aligns more with domestic labour market and immigration policies and the economic imperative for increased trade than with enhancing the nation’s innovation or research agenda as part of a global knowledge economy. Thus, as She and Wotherspoon (2013) note, while Canada has demonstrated its potential in attracting IS – the country has had the fastest growth in IS enrolment over the past decade with its major advantage being its channels to permanent residency – it remains relatively disadvantaged when compared to countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom because of its low stock of IS and the low proportion of IS in post-graduate programs.

Conclusion

Gale’s policy historiography approach enables us to study specific policy domains across different time periods to examine the “possible relationships between the socio-educational present and the socio-educational past” (Kincheloe quoted in Gale 2001, 385). In investigating Canada’s IS
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As Codd (1988) has written, “policies produced by and for the state are obvious instances in which language serves a political purpose, constructing particular meanings and signs that work to mask social conflict and foster commitment to the notion of a universal public interest” (237). She and Wotherspoon (2013) rightly suggest that “managing IS policy as part of the strategy to manage highly skilled migration goes beyond merely a matter of skill formation and in fact represents specific social relations and power struggles in each host nation” (12). “The management of IS mobility, among other national strategies aiming at the high skill economy, never exists simply as an economic issue of productivity, but embraces a collective goal of national interests. Host countries’ governments in fact seek to balance the concerns of different stakeholders in order to sustain and strengthen the government’s authority and legitimacy” (She and Wotherspoon 2013, 11–12). The Canadian government has engaged in various legitimization strategies to sanction its role and particular policy approach while giving credence to some voices and largely suppressing the formation of any counter-discourse. In framing its policy discourse, we agree that the Canadian government has privileged specific international agendas and that “these agendas become hegemonic through international (global, supranational) discourse among the myriad of actors and organizations that are involved in their development and education” (Monkman and Baird quoted in Wells 2005, 116). Thus, the growing economic rationale and global policy discourse on higher education as instrumental, neo-liberal, and market-orientated has been privileged. Comparisons to other OECD countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, which share similar policy objectives as Canada, have served as
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a tool of consensus to normalize these dominant policy discourses. The voices of IS themselves, or the sending countries, or for that matter interest groups such as the Canadian Federation of Students, to cite a few examples, are largely missing in the 2014 federal IE policy. Similarly, government investments in academic exchanges and/or research collaborations, such as the US government’s 100,000 strong educational exchange initiatives, the UK government’s India Education and Research Initiative (UKIERI), or Germany’s investments in the German Houses of Science and Innovation (DWIHs), are overlooked as legitimate approaches to IE and the engagement of IS (Becker and Kolster 2012).

Thus, we conclude that while globalization and internationalization will continue to shape global policy rhetoric and discourse, it is ultimately a nation’s particular historical, geopolitical, economic, and cultural context that will determine the borrowing of the global policy discourse, its adaptation to national/local interests, and its final outcomes. In short, we assert that the nation state matters. In the case of Canada, its unique system of federalism, its domestic demographic challenges, its geopolitical location vis-à-vis the United States, and a growing conservatism within its society are just a few characteristics that will continue to differentiate how and what aspects of the global policy rhetoric the country chooses to engage with. We agree with Drezner (2001) when he states that

an approach that concedes the significance of globalization but also asks how states try to maximize their relative advantage in such a world is fruitful … [because] globalization is not deterministic; there is no single predicted location for policy convergence. The ability of states to cooperate and their ability to agree on norms of governance determine the extent of policy convergence. (78)

References


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