After conflict comes education? Reflections on the representations of emergencies in ‘Education in Emergencies’

Indra Versmesse, Ilse Derluyn, Jan Masschelein & Lucia De Haene


To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2017.1327570

Published online: 30 May 2017.
After conflict comes education? Reflections on the representations of emergencies in ‘Education in Emergencies’

Indra Versmesse, Ilse Derluyn, Jan Masschelein and Lucia De Haene

ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, education has been advanced as a new and legitimate core of the humanitarian crisis response. ‘Education in Emergencies’ (EiE) developed into an institutionalised field of humanitarian practice, advocacy, and scholarly work. Identifying how emergency discourses have been critiqued to operate as ‘social imaginaries’, in this paper the ‘emergency imaginary’ as it develops in the particular discursive context of EiE is analysed. We scrutinise how emergencies are represented in this EiE-discourse by pointing to the socio-ideological and economic drivers of conflict, how the interconnections between education and these drivers are pictured, and the educational changes subsequently advocated for. We conclude that, while EiE has been called a ‘new field of academic and policy research’, the discourse might reiterate prevailing power relations, leading to an adverse portrayal of crisis-affected communities and a legitimation of a global status-quo.

KEYWORDS
Education; conflict; emergencies; humanitarian assistance; discourse; representation

‘Education in Emergencies’ as a ‘new field’

Aid efforts in humanitarian crises have traditionally been associated with short-term physical relief, through provision of water and food, shelter, and health care. However, in the last two decennia, the need for educational assistance in humanitarian crises became growingly emphasised, as the ‘fourth pillar of humanitarian aid’ (INEE-Sphere 2008), or what is nowadays mostly referred to as ‘Education in Emergencies’ (EiE). Advancing education as a new and legitimate humanitarian concern, advocates stressed how education has a crucial role both in mitigating conflict’s psychosocial consequences (e.g. Sommers 1999; INEE 2010a) and in enhancing development and peace (e.g. Pigozzi 1999; Sinclair 2002). In 2000, the EiE-field was institutionalised through the ‘Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies’ (INEE), uniting different international organisations (e.g. UNESCO, UNHCR, and the World Bank), non-governmental organisations (e.g. Save The
Children, Unicef), and scholars. Illustrating why education ought to be a concern of the humanitarian community, INEE (2010a, 3) states:

> Education opportunities mitigate the psychosocial impact of conflict and disasters by providing a sense of routine, stability, structure and hope for the future. [...] Crises provide an opportunity to teach all members of a community new skills and values: for example, the importance of inclusive education, participation and tolerance, conflict resolution, human rights, environmental conservation and disaster prevention.

The institutionalisation of EiE was accompanied by various academic publications, with scholarly and policy studies aiming at bolstering support for education as a humanitarian concern – though it should be noted that until now support remains rhetorical, rather than having resulted in increased funding allocations. In the introduction to the Forced Migration Review, ‘Education in Emergencies: Learning for a Peaceful Future’, Talbot (2005, 5) points out how ‘[e]ducation in conflicts, emergencies, and early reconstruction is a newly emerging field of academic research, policy research, and teaching. [...] Research is therefore needed to support advocacy of education as both a humanitarian and a development priority’. This urge to advance education as a humanitarian priority led in particular to a research focus on the rationales as advanced by the humanitarian community, that is, education’s role in psychological coping and conflict prevention. In the recently launched academic journal on EiE, the Journal on Education in Emergencies this link between research and advocacy is further exemplified: Burde (2015, 6) in an editorial note stresses how the journal aims ‘to provide access to the ideas and evidence necessary to inform sound EiE-programming, policy making, funding decisions, and future research’, in particular ‘the much-needed evidence on the effects crisis has on education, and education on crisis’ (12).

**A ‘new field’ of evidence? Tackling underlying representations**

As under the flag of ‘Education in Emergencies’ both academia and vested international institutes started to engage in studies on education in (the aftermath of) humanitarian crises, criticisms arose on how the majority of studies were fixed on an institutional perspective – also because the term ‘EiE’ was only introduced in (academic and policy) research in the aftermath of INEE’s institutionalisation (Dicum 2008; Chelipi-den Hamer, Fresia, and Lanoue 2010; Epstein 2010). In particular, noting how research topics predominantly derive from a need to discursively legitimatise the rationales as advanced by the humanitarian community, scholars critically argue that this obscures ‘the actual practices and resources of children who grow up in the midst of chronic war and displacement, and their uses of education’ (Epstein 2010, 22). Relatedly, Bromley and Andina (2010, 581) argue that the standards developed in the field (e.g. INEE’s handbook Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies) appear as ‘cultural blueprints [...] set up in abstract of the diverse histories and challenges facing different regions of the world’. Here, they contend that these standards are mostly useful to bolster the rather recent idea that it is legitimate for the humanitarian field to engage in education, rather than to optimise EiE-programming.

These critical notes coincide with criticisms raised within political theory on the humanitarian community’s deployment of emergency vocabulary (and the sometimes uncritical acceptance of this jargon by scholars), whereby the emergency rhetoric as it appeared at
the end of the 1980s denotes a particularly western mode of understanding crisis (e.g. Rieff 2002; Calhoun 2004; Fassin and Pandolfi 2010). In this, Calhoun (2004, 376) indicates how the emergency, or what he calls ‘the emergency imaginary’, is particularly significant as a discursive formation, ‘a category that shapes the way in which we understand and respond to specific events, and the limits to what we think are possible actions and implications’ (own emphasis). First, considering how the ‘emergency imaginary’ shapes our understanding, it is noted how – given the wide presence of humanitarian rhetoric and image in today’s public sphere – this imaginary is a crucial determinant in the public’s understanding (or imagination) of crises (Rieff 2002; Bornstein and Redfield 2010). Yet, these imaginaries are criticised for ‘framing’ events not as they look to locals, but as they appear to cosmopolitans’ (Calhoun 2010, 54), and relatedly, for reproducing stereotypes of the global South rather than thoroughly informing the public about faraway crises. As Burman (1994, 248) critically notes, ‘disaster imaginary’ is prone to ‘promote dynamics of relating toward emergencies and disasters that reiterate prevailing power relations’. Second, as ‘the emergency imaginary’ spurs humanitarian responses as well, it has been argued how these responses are too frequently conceptualised in abstract of on the ground needs (Calhoun 2004). Here, critiques are put forth on how humanitarian interventions tend either to get used as a cover to abstain from addressing structural root causes of crisis (e.g. Macrae and Leader 2001) or worse, as a cover to legitimise political interventions that support western political interests (e.g. Duffield 2005; Pupavac 2010). Hence, while interventions are bolstered by humanitarian arguments in which empathy for the beneficiaries appears crux, de facto their interests quite often are bypassed (Fassin and Pandolfi 2010). This can be illustrated by humanitarian interventions in educational systems in crisis-affected regions. For instance, it has been argued that the USAID-led support to the Afghan educational system was used as an instrument of the occupation, which, contrary to the beneficiaries’ interests, led to increasing attacks on the educational system (Novelli 2010).

In this paper, we locate this question to the ‘emergency imaginary’ in the particular context of EiE, aiming to explore the EiE-discourse’s representation (or: imagination) of emergencies. Hence, we intend to deal with the discursive understandings that are produced, not with the on the ground practices that are generated, which would necessitate an empirical analysis that is beyond the scope of this article. If discourse and action are likely to be intertwined, an analysis of the EiE-discourse ought, however, not to be reduced to how it might spur action: as Foucault (1970/1981, 52) stated, discourse is ‘not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination’, yet, by discursively ‘gaining mastery’ over reality, acts as a form of power in itself, producing certain truths while excluding others. Furthermore, writing from a Foucauldian perspective, Fairclough and Wodak (1997, 258) stress how discourses form ‘part of the resources which people deploy in relating to another’, and through the way in which things are represented and people positioned ‘can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations’. Hence, while the EiE-discourse has been criticised both for its inaccurate representation of beneficiaries’ perspectives and contexts, and for its inapt understanding of educational interventions in humanitarian crises, our focus is precisely on how beneficiaries and their contexts are discursively represented, and on what this implies for how the relation between givers and receivers of educational assistance is discursively construed.
As Foucault (1970/1981, 59) points out how discourses are bound by ‘a corpus of propositions considered to be true’, the subsequent analysis of EiE-discourse and its representations of emergencies elaborates two crucial and interrelated propositions in the field, namely the complex interconnections between education and crisis, and the need for educational change, so as to contribute to psychological healing and peace. We depart from two influential policy research papers, that is, Bush and Saltarelli’s (2000) Unicef report on The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict in which the authors focus on an ‘examination of the peace-building and peace-destroying role of education’ (x, emphasis in original), and Pigozzi’s (1999) Unicef report Education in Emergencies and for Reconstruction: A Developmental Approach in which she advocates for considering the emergency as an ‘opportunity for change’. While it ought to be stressed that these authors were not the first to explore the topics of conflict and education or international aid and educational change, it is clear how humanitarian actors’ appropriation of these themes, and the academic discussions on EiE thereby generated, are inspired by both policy papers. This does not mean that these two papers suffice to account for the entire contemporary EiE-discourse; as Fairclough (1989, 20) notes, discourses are ‘the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part’. If we cannot account for the totality of texts on EiE and inevitably made a selection our analysis will demonstrate how different academic and policy papers engage in ‘social interaction’ with other texts in the field, as such contributing to a partly stable, partly variable representation of the world, and the concurrent ‘effectivity of the discourse’ (Fairclough 2003, 124). Here, we first and foremost point to the ‘commonalities and continuities in the way the world is represented’ (Fairclough 2003, 124), or what Foucault (1970/1981, 59) calls the ‘nodes of coherence’, while points of divergence will equally be stressed. As Fairclough (2003, 124) notes, discourses are ‘heterogeneous entities’ in which the outcome of the struggle over meaning is never guaranteed.

Our critical analysis of representations as evoked through the EiE-discourse will be inspired by discussions taking place in other scholarly domains, in particular: (i) anthropological literature questioning the humanitarian discourse’s representations of beneficiaries (e.g. Malkki 1996; Summerfield 2000); (ii) contributions from educational philosophy reflecting on peace education (e.g. Gur-Ze’ev 2001; Feldt 2008); and (iii) literature on the political economy of conflict, addressing the international political stakes in conflict (and conflict prevention) (e.g. Cramer 2002; Duffield 2005). Of course, this means we subjugate ourselves to other discourses – as Foucault (1970/1981, 67) notes, ‘the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor’. Hence, rather than perceiving our analysis as an endpoint or ‘the’ new truth, we hope to contribute to a possibility for reconsidering the understandings produced through the EiE-discourse, and those of whom it speaks.

**The starting point: the ‘complex and multiple’ relations between conflict and education**

A first premise in the EiE-discourse is that education and conflict should be thought of in relation to another, that, as Bush and Saltarelli (2000, vii) put it, an understanding of ‘the constructive and destructive impact of education – the two faces of education’ (emphasis in original) is needed. Their thesis resonates in academic and policy research: the World Bank (2005, xv) for instance notes how its reconstruction efforts should consider that ‘schools
are almost always complicit in conflict’, and the ‘Journal on Education in Emergencies’ is dedicated to concretise their ‘powerful theory’, that is, that ‘education […] is not an unalloyed good because it can contribute to either conflict or peace’, by ‘in-depth case studies’ (Burd 2015, 16). Not surprisingly, this proposition gives impetus to a debate on educational changes in crisis. Pigózzi (1999, 5) most pressingly calls for this requisite of change, arguing that in conflict-affected areas ‘the education system must be rebuilt rather than merely re-instituted; it must change in profound ways’ (emphasis in original). This urge for peace-enhancing educational changes is crux to many publications on EiE, yet it must be stressed how often these explicitly oppose the perception of education as ‘a panacea’ (e.g. Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Smith 2005; Murray 2008). Rather, since ‘education inevitably has a societal impact – for good or for ill’ (Bush and Saltarelli 2000, x, emphasis added), the contention is that educational assistance, if committed to peace, ought to depart from an apprehension of the contextual ‘role of education as a social and cultural institution’ (Pigózzi 1999, 5), so that EiE can impact on society in a positive, and peace-contributing manner. Illustrating this further, INEE (2010b, 13) notes in its working paper *The Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts* how ‘an analysis of education’s role(s) in conflict and fragility is indispensable as the basis for education policy, planning and programming to ensure that education does not exacerbate conflict’. Here, a ‘thorough examination of the drivers and dynamics of conflict’ and an analysis of education’s interactions with those drivers and dynamics’ (INEE 2010b) is then called for. As we explore the EiE-discourse’s representation of emergencies, in our subsequent analysis we delineate how it articulates both the socio-ideological and the economic drivers of crisis, the ‘inevitable’ relation between education and these drivers, and the educational changes subsequently advocated for. Our analysis of the socio-ideological and the economic narrative will be followed by a separate critique, which we integrate in the conclusion.

**Education and the socio-ideological drivers of conflict**

Positioning that school plays a crucial role in ‘ethnic socialisation’; Bush and Saltarelli’s (2000, 3) publication on *The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict* has been, and still is, pivotal in the EiE-discourse’s delineation of the socio-ideological aspects of conflict, and education’s relation to these:

> The negative face shows itself in the uneven distribution of education to create or preserve privilege, the use of education as a weapon of cultural repression, and the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance. The positive face goes beyond the provision of education for peace programmes, reflecting the cumulative benefits of the provision of good quality education. These include the conflict-dampening impact of educational opportunity, the promotion of linguistic tolerance, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, and the ‘disarming’ of history. (Bush and Saltarelli 2000, v)

As ‘a good quality education’ is stated to be conflict-dampening, and so they suggest this education can mitigate the socio-psychological consequences of conflict: ‘the demilitarisation impact of education’ may ‘dismantle the cultural and socio-psychological predisposition of an individual to use violence as a first, rather than last, resort’, and a ‘peace-building education’ can teach children ‘that alternatives exist, if choices are made’ (Bush and Saltarelli 2000, 29, emphasis in original). Bush and Saltarelli’s ideas resonate in a variety of
publications. Stating how ‘it is well-researched and documented that there are two “faces” to education’, INEE (n.d. a), for example, warns how ‘children and youth are more susceptible to manipulation […] and oftentimes do not have the skills and knowledge that allow them to make critical judgments’. This brings INEE (n.d. b) to perceive the ‘development of critical thinking skills’ as a key task for EiE-practice. In a similar vein, a Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) publication, following Bush and Saltarelli’s advice to explore how ‘conflict affects a child’s education’ and how ‘education can enhance the physical and psychosocial protection’, argues that ‘during conflict, children lose the sense of what it means to be a good citizen and how to live in a non-confrontational way’ (Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003, i). Consequently, it is recommended that EiE-programming should ‘build children’s skills in listening, problem-solving and conflict resolution’ (Nicolai and Triplehorn 2003, 11). In turn, Aguilar and Retamal (2009, 1), referring to the HPN publication, outline strategies for ‘a humanitarian curriculum’ to support a ‘healing school climate’ and note:

[B]reaking the cycle of abuse of children that have been victims of war and trauma constitutes quality education, able to improve not only cognitive skills, but most important to prevent the cycle of anger and human destructiveness at social and generational level. (Aguilar and Retamal 2009, 6)

As a ‘quality education’ ought to foster ‘alternative choices’ and ‘critical judgment’, more systemic changes are equally proposed by Bush and Saltarelli (2000), such as ensuring school access on an equal footing, ‘linguistic tolerance’ and a ‘disarming of history’. Yet, it certainly is Pigozzi (1999, 5) who most pressingly stresses the requisite of change, arguing that ‘education must be transformed to develop citizens who value peace, respect for others, questioning and diversity’. In this, so she further contends, ‘emergencies can provide an opportunity for transforming education, [t]hey allow for the possibility of reconstructing a social institution that helps develop and form the human resources that determine the way a society functions’ (Pigozzi 1999, 4, emphasis in original). In the introduction of the 2005 Forced Migration Review ‘Education in Emergencies: Learning for a Peaceful Future’, Talbot (2005, 6) calls for the need to empirically explore what he dubs ‘the Pigozzi hypothesis’. Ergo, the various contributions in the volume evolve around educational changes, addressing the need for a revision of the history curriculum (e.g. Bird 2005; Sommers and Buckland 2005), a less authoritarian pedagogy (e.g. Nicolai 2005), more equal access mechanisms (e.g. Fawcett 2005; Sommers and Buckland 2005), and the teaching of ‘life skills’ (e.g. Sinclair 2005). Of course, one could note that these elements are little specific to contexts of emergencies and are addressed in educational policies worldwide. Indeed, Bush and Saltarelli (2000, 14) remark how their ‘description of formal education processes is probably accurate in relation to many settings – North, South, East and West’. Yet, as they further note, ‘democratic, participative and inclusive schools’ are ‘an ideal that is rarely present in the North, let alone in the South’ (Bush and Saltarelli 2000, emphasis added). Hence, arguably the suggestion is that reform is more pertinent in southern and conflict-affected societies, where, as Pigozzi (1999) notes, the education system ‘must change’. However, it is precisely this that she identifies as a profound challenge:
Education in emergency situations has [by donors] frequently been viewed as a short-term response that is a ‘stop-gap’ measure until normalcy can be restored: a relief effort. This concept must be challenged. The challenge is especially important with regard to human-made, or ‘complex’, emergencies because this concept ignores the role of education as a social and cultural institution that is used by society to instill attitudes, values, and certain types of knowledge in its newest citizens, its future leaders. (Pigozzi 1999, 4, emphasis added)

This critique on a mere focus on relief, or the restoration of normality, remains strongly present within the EiE-discourse (e.g. Novelli and Lopes Cardozo 2008; UNHCR 2016). In a recently issued fact sheet on Education in Emergencies by the European Commission, this is attributed to ‘the fact that other life-saving emergency actions often take priority’, which, so it is argued, neglects ‘the positive benefits of education for children caught up in a crisis and the important role that it plays in ensuring peace and stability in the long-term’ (ECHO 2016, 1). In a similar vein, and also adhering to Pigozzi’s suggestion on how the emergency might expedite change, the IIEP7 report Opportunities for Change: Education Innovation and Reform During and After Conflict states how ‘opportunities undoubtedly arise when armed conflict causes a breakdown in institutions and people face disruption in their lives, [leading] to a greater willingness to reflect on and change the way things are done’ (Nicolai 2009, 63). In turn, Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO states in the foreword of the 2011 EFA-report The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education how ‘we are mandated to combat through education the “ignorance of each other’s ways and lives” that has fueled armed conflict across the ages. […] We need to be far more effective at exploiting windows of opportunity for peace’ (UNESCO 2011, i). Talking in terms of a vague ‘we’, clearly the need for international involvement in educational reform is pointed at. This is equally apparent in Pigozzi’s (1999) call for the ‘emergency as an opportunity for change’, as the mandatory change is necessary precisely to achieve ‘the international “core”’, that is, ‘the “critical elements” [that] are common regardless of context or geographic location, although the sequencing and approach to them will vary greatly’ (Pigozzi’s 1999, 4). Following Pigozzi’s suggestion for ‘a long overdue change of paradigm from an assistance concept to a development concept’, Seitz (2004, 42) develops a similar argument in his often-cited report The Role of Education in the Creation, Prevention and Resolution of Societal Crises: Consequences for Development Cooperation:

Through support for education […] development agencies have a crucial, if sensitive, role to play in furthering non-violent solutions to inter-group conflict […]. This can range from support for the development of non-partisan curricula and textbooks, to help cultivate and disseminate shared values such as tolerance and pluralism, to specific assistance for ‘peace education’ initiatives designed to help create a better understanding of the origins and history of societal relations and promote inter-group co-operation and reconciliation. The considerable development co-operation resources currently allocated to the field of education in many countries should place donors in a good position to play a central role in these areas. (Seitz 2004, 14, emphasis added)

Here, it must be stressed how this requisite for the humanitarian community to engage in ‘conflict-dampening’ educational changes does not imply a neglect of community participation (e.g. INEE 2010a; Burde 2015). As Pigozzi (1999, 4) too notes, ‘parents and community members should be respected partners in the educational process’.
To summarise, the EiE-discourse’s outline of the negative face of education clearly evokes the presumption that conflict is both driven, and further generated by conflict-inducing education and socialisation. Here, educational interventions are deemed necessary to alter prevailing modes of education and socialisation. In what follows, we scrutinise how the EiE-discourse evokes an essentialised representation of conflict and peace. Second, we argue that these representations are related to a pathologising portrayal of conflict-affected communities, and a claim of moral authority by the EiE-discourse’s exponents, de facto ‘the’ international community. Third, we contend that the EiE-discourse paradoxically risks leading to a reduction in attention for crises, and the possibilities for enhancing global solidarity.

**Conflict and peace as a ‘regime of truth’?**

Educational reform is understood in a somewhat paradoxical way. On the one hand, individuals apparently need to ‘choose’ to see the world differently, on the other hand, these reforms are to be led by international actors, in order to rightly direct these individual choices. We argue that peace is portrayed as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1970/1981), or as with Gur-Ze’ev’s (2001, 328) comments on mainstream peace-education theory, an ideology is set up in which ‘the conceptualisation that divides peace and violence parallels the division between truth and falsity’. Here, truth becomes appropriated by exponents of the EiE-discourse, seemingly having acquired the true understanding of ‘the origins of societal relations’ (Seitz 2004) (and hence more knowledge on how peace can be created), whereas conflict-affected societies are represented as lacking this understanding, and consequently are excluded from expressing truth. In this regard, Feldt’s (2008, 191) research on international stakeholders’ involvement in rewriting Palestinian history education is worth referring to, since he notes how the belief in one ‘empirical scientific history to determine who is right or wrong in the history of Israel and Palestine’ ended up ‘delegitimiz[ing] the experiences of people’ (Feldt’s 2008, 195). While he points to the possible implications of translating truth claims in practice, it also occurs to us that the EiE-discourse denigrates conflict-affected communities’ worldviews. Namely, when arguing that education ought to break ‘the cycle of anger’ (Aguilar and Retamal 2009), or ought to ‘instill attitudes’ so that its ‘newest citizens’ can prevent emergencies (Pigozzi 1999), what is seemingly suggested is that conflict-affected communities can only possess ‘wrong truths’: if they had known the truth, crisis could have been prevented. It should be stressed how the necessity of a contextual analysis as advocated for in the EiE-discourse does not oppose this ‘regime of truth’, as it seems that a contextual analysis is merely deemed necessary in order to install the factuality of the causes of conflict (of which, apparently, education must be one), rather than to forge a consideration of situated and possibly different ways to look at these contexts. Problematising this, our aim is not to insinuate that ideas of ‘local’ communities are necessarily opposed to ‘globally’ framed ideas, or if different would necessarily be ‘better’ (see also Butt 2002), yet to point at the risk to a priori disqualify conflict-affected communities’ worldviews. Of course, one could ask, does the accent on community participation not imply a recognition of others’ perspectives? Here though, following Sobe (2007, 49), we argue that at present this notion rather testifies to the need for discursive (and maybe operational) legitimacy, than to a commitment to ‘an inclusive democratic politics’. As the premise remains that...
peace-enhancing changes must happen and that conflict-affected communities need to become incorporated in this process, the discursive emphasis on community participation does not alter the representation of conflict-affected communities as lacking truth. Below, we further elaborate on how worldviews are made sense of in the EiE-discourse, both the apparently deficit subjectivity of ‘the other’ and the seeming objectivity of those who can speak in the name of the EiE-discourse.

**A de-humanised ‘regime of truth’ and a pathologisation of conflict-affected communities?**

We have outlined how truth is framed as opposed to the ‘local’ transmission of bias. Conflict-affected communities are represented in a pathologising manner, an issue most clearly illustrated by how the delegitimation of a focus on relief de facto gains meaning as a condemnation of what, apparently, would be a normal way of acting for them. A very particular understanding of the psychological consequences of conflict seems to underlie this, assuming that wrongful experiences make one understand the world in a wrongful way and so transmit wrongful worldviews. Almedom and Summerfield (1999, 383) criticise this assumption, or what they refer to as the ‘brutalisation thesis’, arguing that it not only lacks empirical evidence but equally represents conflict-affected people as a ‘diminished humanity’. Arguing that ‘the’ international community all too often adheres to this thesis in its discussions on the consequences of growing up in (the aftermath) of conflict, Summerfield (2000, 427) critically questions:

[Might this understanding not] distort how international assistance to these children – now or later – is prioritized, as well as coloring how society comes to think of them, or they of themselves? Were the millions of children caught up in World War II in Europe similarly ‘brutalized’ and, if so, what became of it? Arguably these characterisations are not really about far-off children, but about ourselves, Western civilisation and its ideals.

Following Summerfield, we argue that the EiE-discourse acts first and foremost as a reconfirmation of an ‘unproblematised self’ (Jabri 2001), rather than acquainting us with ‘distant others’ (Boltanski 1999) lived experiences of conflict, and/or how societies deal with raising their children in the midst of this. Here, our point is certainly not to deny that war is a devastating experience which might influence socialisation processes, but to question the discourse’s portrayal of this as a process of brutalisation, and how this merely reproduces popular stereotypes on conflict and others’ ‘uneducatedness’. Indeed, as exponents of the EiE-discourse tend to position themselves as morally above conflict dynamics, there is the risk of suggesting that a reflection on how to acknowledge and deal with socially embedded truths is irrelevant for ‘us’. Here, as we argue in the next section, the predilections of living in crises also risk sinking into oblivion.

**A decontextualised ‘regime of truth’ and a withdrawal of international attention?**

This pathologisation of others’ mindsets tends, so we argue, to be accompanied by a disregard for the contexts where their change of mindset supposedly ought to occur. This argument is also hinted at by Halstead and Affouneh (2006), as they question, with
regards to the Palestinian situation, how young people ought to learn for peace, while at the same time they have to cross checkpoints each day to reach school. In a similar vein, Sagy (2008, 375), in her exploration of the INEE-supported Peace Education Programme (PEP) set up for refugee camps, argues that these programmes ‘shift the focus from conditions in camps, history, and politics to individual interests and attitudes’ and so end up ‘obscuring structural and root causes’ of conflict and displacement. Inspired by these examples, we argue that the EiE-discourse’s reiterated accent on the need to make different ‘choices’ not only construes choice as truth and by doing so pathologises conflict-affected communities, but equally runs the risk of dismissing the contexts in which choice can be enacted. Might it not be so that the reiterated focus on the need ‘to reflect on the way things are done’ (Nicolai 2009, 63), to develop ‘citizens who value peace’ (Pigozzi 1999, 5), to alter ‘cultural and psychological predispositions’ (Bush and Saltarelli 2000, 29) implies a dismissal of others’ day-to-day experiences of coping with what, after all, are often difficult living circumstances and conditions of long endurance?

Here, Duffield’s (2001) argument might render intelligible some of the reasons for this discursive decontextualisation. He notes how today northern political actors perceive insecurity in the periphery as directly consequential to insecurity ‘at home’ (e.g. through migration, terrorism threat), and he argues that international aid is often instrumentalised to contain these supposed risks, rather than to address their global root causes – or as he states, international aid is ‘now directly concerned with trying to change the way people think and what they do’ (Duffield 2001, 312) rather than with contesting structural injustices. Of course, answering the question whether EiE-interventions end up at defending a global status-quo needs empirical research. Evans (2008) for example observed how a humanitarian supported education programme for Bhutanese refugees, contrary to its intent, caused violent resistance against the camp authorities, which she explicitly depicts as a form of empowerment, even if it does not come under the intended form of ‘peaceful behaviour’. Yet, at a discursive level, a global status-quo arguably is legitimised, as the need for peaceful behaviour rather than questions on national and global justice are evoked. If though international solidarity exists in a recognition of human equality and a global responsibility for conditions of inequality, this focus on how others’ supposed ‘predispositions’ ought to be changed, seems to us not very promising. Instead, the EiE-discourse might operate as a ‘tranquillizer’ (Malkki 2010, 71), allowing one to keep away from a confrontation with how people cope and deal with restricting and enduring realities elsewhere. In sum, contexts of crises that on the one hand call for action, at the same time risk slipping from our minds.

**Education and the economic drivers of conflict**

In the EiE-discourse’s delineation of the economic drivers of conflict a point of departure is the popular idea that education can stimulate economic development, which, in turn, can enhance peace. As Pigozzi (1999, 16) stresses, education can ‘be of great value to countries that are recovering from complex emergencies and that are going through restructuring to enable them to better participate in the global economy’. Especially pronounced is an opposition between economic participation, as stimulated by education, and conflict participation, as stimulated by a lack of education. INEE (2010b, 7) states:
Collier and Hoeffler offer perhaps the strongest argument concerning the role of education in the relationship between poverty and conflict: they find that a 10 percent increase in enrollment rates in secondary schools can reduce the average risk of conflict by three percentage points, and that male secondary school rates are negatively related to the duration of conflict. Their explanation for this relationship is that as educational attainment rises, the potential income that rebel recruits would have to forgo in order to join a rebellion rises, making it less likely that rebellion will occur.

The research report Where Peace Begins: Education’s Role in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (Save the Children 2008, 7) also cites Collier’s work. Referring to what Collier calls ‘the conflict trap’, that is, how ‘poverty increases the likelihood of civil war that in turn increases the rates of poverty’, the report argues that education can break this trap as ‘one year of education can raise the living wage of men and women by an average of 10%’. As Collier and Hoeffler’s work supports these arguments, we briefly elaborate on their 1998 report On the Economic Causes of Civil War, popularised through many World Bank papers. In their work, education is listed as an economic variable and an inverse association between the proportion of young males in the population combined with their average years of schooling and the occurrence of conflicts is found. The authors interpret this finding by, first, contending that individuals make ‘a rational choice’ to participate in conflict when this is economically more profitable than peaceable economic activities, and, second, that educational attainment alters this choice, as the more educated one is, the more equipped he becomes to participate in development and to support himself through peaceable economic activities (Collier 2004). In their work education is thus portrayed as intrinsically beneficial.

However, the EiE-discourse emphasis on ‘the dual face of education’, which in the economic narrative primarily gains meaning in reference to so-called frustrated expectations on economic opportunity, ascribes to education a somewhat more ambivalent role. For instance, the 2005 World Bank report Reshaping the Future Education and Postconflict Reconstruction, re-iterating how Bush and Saltarelli’s work has led to ‘a growing recognition of the role that schools and education systems can play in reproducing many of the factors that underlie much civil conflict’ (Collier 2004, 9), notes how educational opportunities can also evoke ‘frustrated expectations’ on economic participation, which, consequently, ‘can exacerbate social tensions or may themselves generate new sources of tension in societies’ (Collier 2004). This ambivalence, albeit from a somehow different angle, informs Kagawa’s (2005) paper. Urging ‘a critical examination of notions of development’, he criticises Pigozzi’s work as a model of ‘modernization in which development means economic growth following in the footsteps of western industrialized nations’ (Kagawa 2005, 498). However, on a further reading, alternative models of development are important to the EiE-discourse, precisely since these are assumed to alter the risk of ‘frustrated expectations’ and thus of conflict participation. Here, policy research recurrently stipulates how EiE-programming ought to ensure that ‘education and livelihoods’ are related, so that ‘the economic skills learned are useful’ (INEE 2010a, 76). This idea installs a plea for educational opportunities that can stimulate self-reliance, or so-called entrepreneurialism (e.g. Seitz 2004; UNHCR 2012; Talbot 2013). Illustratively, in the IIIEP report Planning Education In and After Emergencies, Sinclair (2002, 80) notes:

It is often best, therefore, to apprentice young people to practicing craftsmen or craftswomen or to learn practical and business skills which are needed in the real world. This is all the more
important in crisis situations where work opportunities are likely to be in the informal sector rather than based on certificates. (emphasis added)

Here, we need to stress how the focus on matching education with local economic opportunity has been the subject of debate in scholarly work on EiE (e.g. Paulson and Rappleye 2007; Maclure and Denov 2009). Novelli and Lopes Cardozo (2008, 483) for instance raise the need for a macro-systemic analysis of the economic causes of conflict, that is, to ‘explore the field of Education and Conflict as a sector embedded within a complex and highly unequal system of local, national, regional and global actors, institutions and practices’. Explicitly adhering to Pigozzi’s proposition to ‘address the root causes of conflict’ and view ‘emergencies and post-conflict reconstruction periods […] as opportunities for positive transformation’ (Novelli and Lopes Cardozo, 2008, 482), these scholars urge for ‘a more sophisticated account of the mechanisms that both drive and prevent violent conflict in order to develop more sustainable and effective educational programmes’ (486).

In brief, the EiE-discourse’s outline of the economic drivers of conflict relates to an understanding of conflict and especially conflict participation as caused by people’s search for economic gain – which in the case of emergencies might then also be war-related gain. Education is perceived as a preventive mechanism, enabling conflict-affected youth to make a living by engaging in peaceable, development-oriented economic activities. Here, the (albeit criticised) mainstream narrative’s emphasis on how conflict-affected youth need to be withheld from having ‘frustrated expectations’ leads to a discursive emphasis on an educational approach oriented towards craftsmanship or self-reliance. Questioning the discursive representation of emergencies so evoked, in the next paragraph we first scrutinise how poverty is individualised and second, we argue that poverty as a structural phenomenon tends be trivialised. Third, we suggest how the EiE-discourse risks legitimising current existing global inequalities – even if on this point critical voices are emerging.

**Individualising poverty and conflict?**

Suggesting a relation between education and economic development, and between development and peace is certainly not specific to the EiE-discourse. Yet, that individuals’ educational impairments are indicated as a cause for conflict participation and thus for the failure to engage in a peaceful living seems consequential for how conflict-affected societies (or rather: individuals) are discursively represented. Again, so we argue, they are represented in a pathologising manner. While in the EiE-discourse’s delineation of conflict’s socio-ideological causes their supposed inferior moral values are hinted at, in this second narrative it is suggested that conflict-affected individuals also miss economic capabilities. Hence, as popular, yet empirically questionable10 ideas on how poor people are more prone to violence are reiterated in the EiE-discourse, an individualisation and criminalisation of poverty occurs. This portrayal of conflict-affected individuals as incapable to make themselves economically ‘useful’ in a peaceful way has, especially in discussions on Collier and Hoeffler’s theory, evoked quite some criticism (e.g. Cramer 2002; Keen 2002; Goodhand 2003). Cramer (2002, 1846) for instance refutes ‘the myth of a rational choice individualism’ inherent in orthodox economic theories explaining conflict (such as Collier and Hoeffler’s model) and argues that these ‘sack the social and even in their individualism violate the complexity of individual motivation, razing the individual […] down
to monolithic maximizing agents’. Of course, so one might note, in the EiE-discourse the social is accounted for. Yet, as the social causes of conflict are rather categorised as irrational, the apparent suggestion is that the only rational drivers to conflict are those related to economic interests. As only these are deemed worthy of ‘our’ understanding – even though distant others continue to be blamed, by pointing at their supposed economic impairments – a situated and more thorough understanding of faraway contexts might still remain absent. This will be considered further in the next paragraph.

**Global partaking as self-reliance: a trivialisation of the emergency?**

At first glance, this critique on individualisation and how this leads to an abstraction of contexts might sit uneasily with the EiE-discourse, since the need for relating education and context is continuously emphasised. However, the suggestion that conflict-affected people miss the economic skills to deal adequately with their context, or what Sinclair (2002) refers to as ‘the real world’, risks resulting in a trivialisation of both crisis and poverty. In particular, the suggestion that on the one hand participation in global development is merely obstructed by their lack of economic skills, while on the other hand people assumingly ought to be withheld from having ‘frustrated expectations’ on economic opportunities, seems to evoke the idea that it suffices for economic skills to be matched with contexts of (enduring) crisis. In this regard, we can build on Pupavac’s (2010, 138) criticism on current ‘sustainable development’ discourses, in which she elucidates how these discourses suggest that beneficiaries need to reconcile to a world without substantial expectations of material progress, as if ‘the majority of the people in the developing world want only to be fisherman or farmers’ (Pupavac’s 2010, 138). These discourses, so she consequently argues, evoke representations profoundly detached from what beneficiaries themselves would prefer. So, one might question what ‘educational opportunities’ offering hope for a better future actually mean, when the debate revolves around how education can make people accept and cope with economic difficulties as they are, rather than drawing attention to and challenging a global order with rising inequalities (see also Tikly 2004). In the next paragraph, we conclude by discussing how, especially in policy research, a global status-quo risks being discursively legitimised.

**Legitimising global status-quo?**

As conflict-affected people’s supposed maladaptedness to their ‘real’ economic contexts is the main concern, we argue that global inequalities risk being legitimised. Duffield’s (2005, 2006) critique on self-reliance discourses supports this analysis of the EiE-discourse as favouring a global status-quo. He argues that self-reliance discourses tend to dichotomise the world’s population between a free and mobile global citizenry and a contained and ‘self-reliant species-life’ (Duffield 2006, 68), and he most critically notes how this involves a sociocultural racism that legitimises unequal life chances between ‘us’ and ‘them’:

[T]he constant humanitarian disasters, breakdowns and divergent life-chances that embody the permanent crisis are seldom seen as arising from the impossibility of self-reproduction. To the contrary, for embedded humanitarians and development functionaries they occur because underdeveloped species-life is not socially entrepreneurial and hence self-reliant enough. […] It] enables a small part of the world’s population to live through consuming
beyond its means while a larger part is allowed to die chasing the mirage of self-reliance. (Duffield 2005, 156)

Interestingly, the EiE-discourse evokes a fundamentally different representation of the role of international actors in engaging with the assumed economic triggers from engaging with its socio-ideological triggers. Within the narrative on socio-ideological causes, the EiE-discourse suggests an absolute need for international involvement, producing, as argued, a ‘regime of truth’. Yet within the economic narrative, the international community envisions itself taking on a much more modest role: while international assistance can help in depicting the ‘necessary skills’, self-reliance without external support on the long-term is needed. Apparently there are, as Duffield (2005) argues, those who can ‘consume beyond its means’ and ‘those who can chase the mirage of self-reliance’ – or, in the words of the EiE-discourse, there are places where certificates have meaning, and places where craftsmanship is the right track. Hence, while moral hierarchies between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are reproduced, economic power imbalances risk being neglected. This confirms the risk we have already pointed at, that the EiE-discourse may act as ‘tranquilizer’ (Malkki 2010), as if the appeal to crisis at the same time needs to veil its ongoing predicaments. Imagining solidarity then becomes a challenge rather than an element that is stimulated through the EiE-discourse. Critical voices within the EiE-discourse do problematise the risk for EiE-practices to legitimise a global status-quo of economic inequalities, even if on a discursive level they adhere both to the premise that education has a dual face and that educational support in humanitarian crisis must and can be peace-contributing. Moreover, one might question whether these critics, in their aim for EiE to alter poverty’s global root causes, do not express ideas that ‘go beyond what education can deliver’ (Bridges 2008, 466), and as such, contrary to their intent, again divert attention from actual contexts.

**Conclusion**

In recent decades, education has been advanced as a new and legitimate core of the humanitarian operation – or what in advocacy, practice, and academic discussions is often referred to as ‘Education in Emergencies’. While it might be questioned whether on the ground humanitarian involvement in educational assistance is increasing, not in the least given the shortage in funding recurrently addressed, the plea that the humanitarian field should engage in EiE has made particular motivations gain widespread resonance. Here, the role of education in mitigating conflict is emphasised, contending that education enhances psychological healing as well as development and peace. These rationales as advanced by the humanitarian field resonate with the issues explored in EiE as an academic discipline. Yet, while both in policy and academic studies on EiE the exploration of the role of education in psychological healing and peace-building is dominant, these topics have been argued to be profoundly removed from beneficiaries’ concerns, as well as from on the ground practices. These criticisms resonate with the articulation of emergencies as ‘social imaginaries’, and how these imaginaries promote understandings and responses that are disconnected from the social contexts they nevertheless set out to address. In this paper, we have examined this ‘emergency imaginary’ in the particular discursive context of EiE. To conclude, we connect the three main themes of our analysis: the abstraction of context and the pathologisation of beneficiaries as apparent in the
EiE-discourse, its legitimation of a global status-quo, and its force to reconfirm an ‘unproblematised self’ rather than truly advance renewed understandings. In this, we hope not to belittle the efforts made in the field to relate critically to these tendencies, but to contribute to a more explicit critique on what remain the dominant representations, the call for ever more nuanced and complex understandings of the relation between conflict and education notwithstanding.

First, as the EiE-discourse essentially portrays an idea of ‘education out of the emergency’, the emergency rhetoric enables a discursive dichotomy between conflict and peace. Notwithstanding that the causes to conflict are framed as ‘multiple and complex’, and despite the emphasis on how education should not be perceived of as ‘a panacea’, the emergency is represented as a testifier to educational impairment; as a demonstration that – precisely given the emergency – education must have a ‘negative face’. In other words, the dichotomy between conflict and peace suggests too a dichotomy between a condition of educational shortcomings prior to the humanitarian intervention, and an idealised condition of educational progress following the humanitarian intervention. Educational lack thereby primarily operates as a signifier of moral ‘uneducatedness’ or economic incapacity, rather than as a condition of lacking formal schooling certificates. In other words, first and foremost an image of deficient communities is evoked: people whose ‘normalcy’ cannot be trusted and whose ‘violent predispositions’ need to be halted; people who are inadequately equipped to engage in the global economy or be self-reliant and thus have turned to violence. Rather than leading to renewed understandings of crisis, and how schools in these conditions deal with the many predicaments, popular stereotypes on conflict and others’ ‘uneducatedness’ are (re)produced. In this, the EiE-discourse seems in particular to point at ‘distant others’ (Boltanski 1999), that is, southern conflict-affected populations where according to some, apparently even ‘the basic skills’ to start with are lacking. When Foucault (1970/1981, 67) states that ‘we must conceive of discourse as a violence we do to things’, the EiE-discourse seems to enclose a symbolic violence in the portrayal of the other as uneducated, or inappropriately educated. In its extremes, one could argue that this pathologisation risks resonating in a rhetoric that portrays them as not-yet-citizens (e.g. Pigozzi 1999), not-yet-equals. Those of whom the discourse speaks are excluded from its truth.

Second, as the apparent urge for an education out of the emergency pictures pathologised individuals, rather than forging a consideration of context, the EiE-discourse risks legitimising a global status-quo. Just as Calhoun (2004, 378) argued that ‘emergency imaginaries’ insinuate ‘exceptions to some sort of normal order […] not a friction within the system, but surges from outside’, the EiE-discourse all too often suggests that the necessary changes need to be neatly confined to ‘their’ context, and even to ‘their’ inner psyche. Here, the presumption that, ideologically, people need to perceive of the world in a more valid way, and, at the same time, economically, need to learn to deal with ‘the real world’, a priori defines the limits of change within current relations of global power. Apparently, the ‘true’ world is one divided into spaces of those who can and cannot claim to possess truth, of those who can take the fruits of a global economy and those who are supposed to work in the margins of it. Discourse being, as Foucault (1970/1981, 53) notes, ‘the power which is to be seized upon’, the question then is whether the projection and delimitation of ‘possible state of affairs’ (Fairclough 2003) as inherent in the EiE-discourse might not imply a curtailment of possibilities for appealing to global solidarity. How, after all, can one
denounce children’s unequal chances to learn, strive to translate the fundamental recognition of human equality in a reality of equal human rights, all the while citing ‘evidence’ which in and by itself opposes the fact that we are indeed equal as human? Academic research on EiE is, as noted, more outspoken on the risk to legitimise a status-quo of global economic inequalities – even if the focus therein is material, rather than discursive.

Lastly, next to contending how unequal power relations are discursively legitimised, we argue that the EiE-discourse derives its force from being rather inexplicit about this. Namely, often the truth claims appearing are only expressed by a vaguely defined ‘we’. The discourse’s apparent vigilance to talk about ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘givers’, or about ‘them’ and ‘us’, only creates more difficulties to discern what actually is continuously made obvious: that educational assistance is needed, not necessarily because ‘we’ have more means to do, but because ‘our’ knowledge can help ‘them’ to prevent what, apparently, we have been preventing all along. Here, the need for assistance is embedded in a claim of moral authority, rather than framed as a part of the global responsibility to create more equal life chances. Claiming moral authority rather than political responsibility, the emergency rhetoric also dichotomises and hierarchises ‘them’ and ‘us’. That this aspect is not made explicit, and ‘we’ could thus be ‘all’, only strengthens the discursive reiteration of power hierarchies, or as Fairclough (1989, 77) points out, the apparent neutrality in struggles for power paradoxically produces the most profound ideological effects, ‘ideology works through disguising its nature, pretending to be what it isn’t’ (Fairclough 1989, 77). The EiE-discourse risks operating primarily as a reconfirmation of an ‘unproblematised self’ (Jabri 2001), rather than as a field in which renewed understandings are enhanced. Or, as Calhoun (2004, 393) stated, ‘the emergency imaginary serves an important function as a mirror in which we are able to affirm our own shaky normality’.

As already stressed, these traps are not necessarily left unnoticed in the field. Yet, by taking a more critical distance from the theoretical frames and research issues as advanced in the field, we hope to have contributed to a more explicit critique.

Finally, we re-emphasise how our presumption is not that all ‘changes’ advocated for in the EiE-discourse are (or will be) realised, and/or that beneficiaries would be the passive receivers of humanitarians’ wished-for changes. Yet, what we have aimed to point at is how the effects of the EiE-discourse might be with us at present. Here, the EiE-discourse, which is likely to resonate in a range of discourses on conflict-affected people in the South, might not only have detrimental consequences for how conflict-affected communities come to be represented, but might equally come to serve ‘the diminutive consciences of the “world community”’ (Malkki 2010, 71), using educational discourse as a cover for current inequalities, instead of as a vehicle for international responsibility. As we criticise this, it must be clear that our point is not to deny that what are dubiously called ‘emergencies’ are indeed real, nor that research, advocacy and practice pertaining to educational assistance for those harmed by crisis are indeed important. What we call for are more fruitful ways to advance this. Maybe, bringing attention to the predicaments of these realities, aiming to assist in these, it could be worthwhile to strive for assistance as a part of acknowledging present global injustices, both the unequal chances for truths to be heard and the unequal opportunities for having a share in this world? Maybe equal rights to education are worth fighting for, precisely because many crisis-affected people acquire little chances for their ‘truths’ to be heard, for their living conditions to be
acknowledged? Presumably, it would then not solely be about ‘their’ education, but could as well be about the education of all of us.

Notes

1. At the dawn of the new millennium the lack of humanitarian budgets for education, 4% of the overall budget, was criticized (e.g. Sommers 1999; Sinclair 2002). The percentage has, however, remained the same (e.g. ECHO 2016; UNHCR 2016).
2. Whereas emergencies are seen as consequences of both natural disaster and conflict, the EiE-field’s focus has mainly been directed to the latter (Chelpi-den Hamer, Fresia, and Lanoue 2010). The term ‘EiE’ appeared for the first time in Graça Machel’s 1996 UN report ‘Impact of armed conflict on children’, indicating how the notion of EiE is inextricably linked to conflict-induced emergencies.
3. Here, Agamben’s (2005) notion of the emergency as ‘a state of exception’ is often referred to describe how the humanitarian argument has become a justification for surpassing national sovereignty and enacting extralegal action.
4. It should be stressed that the critique points to the humanitarian field’s recent educational interventions. Northern interventions in southern educational systems are of course not new, nor are the critiques of these interventions (Sobe 2007).
5. Sinclair (2005, 23) states: ‘Children exposed to violence and aggression from an early age need to be educated in basic life skills and values so that they can develop a sense of respect towards each other and shed prejudices against other ethnic/religious groups’.
7. International Institute for Education Planning, an arm of UNESCO.
8. Here she cites from the 1945 Constitution.
9. As Pigozzi (1999, 13) talks about ‘environmental awareness’ and ‘a sustainable future’, she seems sensitive to this too.
10. Goodhand (2003, 637) argues that the most poor are less likely to be involved in conflict. As he notes, ‘although one can point to a number of links between poverty and bottom up violence, it can be hypothesized that the transient (or ‘churning’) poor are more likely to rebel than the chronically poor, who tend to be the least organized and most passive group in society. Their limited social capital, both a cause and a consequence of their poverty, constrains their capacity for organized resistance.’

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding

This work was supported by the VLIR-UOS [grant number NDOC2013PR003].

Notes on contributors

Indra Versmesse is a doctoral student at the Faculty of Psychology & Educational Sciences, Leuven University, affiliated to the Laboratory for Education and Society. She holds a master’s degree in Social Work and in Conflict and Development. Her principal interests concern the politics of humanitarianism and the global refugee regime. In her research she focuses on humanitarian discourse and practice; specifically the fields’ rhetorical and actual engagement in the provision of refugee education.

Ilse Derluyn is Professor at the Department of Social Work and Social Pedagogy, Ghent University. Her research concerns the psychosocial wellbeing of unaccompanied refugee minors, migrant
and refugee children, war-affected children, victims of trafficking and child soldiers. She is actively involved in supporting refugees and practitioners working with refugees groups, and in policy influence. She has published over 50 international publications and several books. Prof. Derluyn is co-director of the Centre for Children in Vulnerable Situations (CCVS) and heading the Centre for the Social Study of Migration and Refugees (CESSMIR).


Lucia De Haene is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Psychology & Educational Sciences, Leuven University, affiliated to the Laboratory for Education and Society. She conducts research on the psychosocial impact of forced migration in refugee family relationships and clinical research on transcultural trauma care. Specifically, her current research focuses on family and community psychosocial sequelae of organized violence, forced migration, and exile; the role of cultural and collective identifications in coping with traumatic experience during forced dislocation; and process analyses of clinical and community-based psychosocial interventions in host societies.

References


INEE. 2010b. Multiple Faces of Education in Conflict and Fragile Contexts. Paris: INEE.


