Corruption in Education: A Review of the Literature

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A Review of the Literature

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I. Introduction

What types of corrupt practices are observed in the administration of educational systems? What are the main findings regarding the causes and consequences of corruption in education? What methodologies have been used in the research of this topic? What are the main recommendations for education agencies regarding control of corruption? This paper will address all these questions through a systematic review of relevant literature.

The paper will be divided as follows: the first part will describe a typology of corrupt practices observed in educational systems and propose possible paths linking these practices to barriers to educational opportunities. The second section will explain a classification of findings reported in the literature on corruption in education, such as causes, consequences and recommendations, as well as the classification of methodologies applied in the study of corrupt practices. Finally, the third section will describe possible implications from these findings for policy makers.

In order to better support the development of human capabilities, achieving higher levels of transparency and accountability in education agencies is fundamental. Studying corruption in education is relevant because it may increase public awareness on its deleterious effects and also provide political support to implement anti-corruption initiatives in this sector. Unfortunately, research of corruption in education has been neglected (Tanaka, 2001; Hallak and Poisson, 2002 and 2005; Segal 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005) and the limited available research suffers from the lack of reliable data and from a missing
conceptual framework to describe the particularities of corrupt practices in education. In addition, a systematic examination of the possible avenues through which corruption influences the distribution of educational opportunities is absent.

The literature to be reviewed in this paper was obtained from three different sources: a) from electronic databases, including: Academic Search Premier/EBSCO, ERIC/EBSCO, Education Abstracts/EBSCO, Google Scholar, Citation Indices/ISI Web of Science, Proquest Dissertations & Theses, JSTOR, and Lexis-Nexis Academic; b) from databases created by international organizations like Transparency International, ETICO (UNESCO), CLAD, and the U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre; and c), books and available documents found through the Harvard University Hollis database. A complete list of the reviewed studies is included in Appendix one.

II. Corruption in the administration of education systems

This section will describe common characteristics of corrupt practices in education, arguing that this type of corruption represents a complex challenge for governments given the role of education as a means to foster social mobility, achieve political stability, and promote economic development.¹ It will also describe three types of plausible consequences of corruption in educational outcomes regarding: the efficiency of education agencies (e.g. public officials overpaying for educational materials in exchange for bribes); the reproduction of inequalities in the distribution of educational opportunities by determining not just

who gets access to educational services (for instance, through the establishment of illegal enrollment fees) but affecting the quality of education (e.g. teacher absenteeism); and finally, the dissemination of pernicious practices and values among students: given the formative role of schools, corrupt practices (e.g. demanding bribes in exchange for getting better grades) may contribute to perpetuating a culture of illegality and a lack of respect for meritocracy and democratic values.

As a result of the growing recognition on the importance of education, in recent years funding for this sector has been increasing. More international and philanthropic organizations are participating in the implementation of educational policies, and a political consensus has been reached among international and local actors on the importance of achieving universal access to education and improving its quality. In spite of this increased attention, there are serious shortcomings on fundamental educational indicators like universal access, gender equity, or academic achievement in several developing countries.² This paradox of growing attention and poor education results may be explained by different obstacles, both financial and non-financial.

Cohen and Bloom (2005) suggest several non-financial obstacles to achieving universal access to education: economic disincentives (opportunity cost of attending school versus working for income); competing demands (limited

² The 2006 Education for All report establishes that “about 100 million children are still not enrolled in primary school and 23 countries are at risk of not achieving Universal Primary Education by 2015. 86 countries are at risk of not achieving gender parity even by 2015, 76 out of 180 countries have not reached gender parity at primary level, and the disparities are nearly always at the expense of girls. 115 countries (out of 172 with data) still have disparities at secondary level. Less than two-thirds of primary school pupils reach the last grade in 41 countries (out of 133 with data) and 771 million people aged 15 and above live without basic literacy skills”, (UNESCO, 2006)
resources to education because governments allocate funding to other programs like health or roads; lack of information (limited access to credible data on performance of educational systems); cultural barriers (gender and ethnic discrimination); historical context (conditions in countries determining the characteristics and the level of success of educational policies like decentralization); and political pressures (education long-term returns provide limited incentives for politicians concerned with short-term benefits).

Another non-financial obstacle that may contribute to explaining shortcomings in educational outcomes is the limited institutional capacity of education agencies as well as their inadequate organization. Any organization, public or private, will face administrative inefficiencies, inadequate implementation of policies, or erroneous allocation of resources. However, unlike the effects of “unintentional” inefficiencies due to omission or ignorance, corrupt practices will systematically result in goal displacements within organizations because as Van Klavereen (1957, in Heiddenheimer 1989) describes, “corrupt public officials […] consider public offices as business and they […] decide to maximize their personal profits,” in detriment of the organization. Consequently, collective goals (like an equal distribution of educational opportunities in the case of educational agencies) will be displaced by the search for individual benefits.4

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3 Although there are studies explaining the emergence of corruption by focusing on personal characteristics and values as well as on individual proclivity toward corruption (e.g. Wraith and Simpkins, (1953)), this study will mostly concentrate on the effectiveness of the social and political institutions that may explain the emergence and reproduction of corruption in educational settings.

4 Caiden (2001) points out that “as it has been emphasized elsewhere, corruption is a particularly viral form of bureauopathy. Once it enters the life stream of any system, it quickly spreads. If untreated it will eventually [destroy] the effectiveness of the infected area. Even if caught quickly and treated in time, there is no guarantee that it will have been eliminated altogether. Current
Mismanagement and unethical practices that may affect the implementation of policies (e.g. when organizational cultures condone the diversion of public resources to serve private purposes of administrators or teachers), are usually associated with weak institutional capacity and organizational cultures that fail to support an adequate distribution of educational opportunities. This type of organizational culture and the practices that it facilitates and condones is what I call *educational corruption*, a notion based on Nye’s definition of corruption (in Heidenheimer *et. al.*, 1989).

Nye considered corruption as a "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery; use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust; nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); strategies only aim at containment and minimization, not eradication. The ingenious are always one step ahead and will remain so as long as personal integrity is lacking in individuals."

I use the term “educational corruption” for two related reasons: first, because unlike “political corruption” (a type of corruption that Huntington (1968) describes as the “corruption of the rich” in developing countries, where influence and political power are exchanged for money or favors), it locates corrupt education practices within the larger category of administrative practices generally recognized as ‘administrative corruption’ (Gould, 1991, in Khan, 2004); and second, because these practices represent a corruption, in the literal sense of distorting or thwarting the original purpose of the educational enterprise, namely to develop the capabilities and knowledge of students.

Although Tanzi (1997) considers that corruption is “like an elephant: even tough it may be difficult to describe, it is generally not difficult to recognize when observed,” identifying a general and flexible definition of corruption is a real challenge. Finding an appropriate definition of corruption may be considered for some scholars as a Byzantine discussion, however this debate is relevant for two reasons: first, because a comprehensive definition is necessary for enacting legislation against corruption (particularly because the principle of *Nulla poena sine lege* would impede the application of a sanction if a specific conduct is not defined in the law); the second reason is that in the design of policies against corrupt practices, the adoption of a common definition would determine possible policy options and their implementation characteristics.
and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)."

Educational corruption is frequently observed. Examples from any number of countries suggest that this type of corruption is nearly omnipresent and their negative consequences are documented. In the Philippines, for example, teacher candidates bribe educational authorities to be hired (Chua 1999), with the likely outcome that those hired are not necessarily the candidates most capable to teach. In Mexico, embezzlement of public education funds often results in insufficient distribution of textbooks to the schools (Martinez, 2004), affecting academic achievement of students. In Africa, high attrition rates result, in part, from illegal enrollment fees (Cockroft, 1998) and it is likely that students who have to drop out because their inability to afford these illegal payments are those from the poorest families. In the United States, teachers cheating on standardized tests pervert incentive programs (Jacob and Levitt, 2003) which have the likely results of their students receiving a substandard education. In Uganda, Kenya and India, teacher absenteeism is a common problem in rural communities (Reinikka and Smith, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005), which in all

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7Unfortunately, corruption has a longstanding history in our societies. Noonan (1984) describes the origin of legislation against bribes and corruption. He points out that “The starting point of law against corruption was the ancient law of the Inquiry as to Reclaimables (Repentundae). This has been expanded by Julius Caesar in the Lex Iuliana of the 49 B.C., and the Lex Iuliana had been interpreted by the jurists of the third Century A.D. to include taking money to put a man in chains or to take off chains; to give a judgment or not give a judgment; to engage a public contractor or to remit a tax; In a few words, to do more than is required in the exercise of the office.” Tanzi (1998) describes that corruption was discussed more than 2000 years ago in a book titled Arthashastram and in Dante’s “The Divine Comedy” where bribers are sent to “the deepest part of Hell”. He also points out how in the American Constitution, “bribery was one of the two explicitly-mentioned crimes that could lead to the impeachment of a U.S. President.” According to Caiden (2001), “deviant conduct has been expected and accurately recorded by historians brave enough to write about Chinese rulers, Hebrew kings and Roman emperors.”
likelihood diminishes the opportunities for children in these schools to learn the intended curriculum.

Educational corruption represents an urgent challenge for governments because, schools are social institutions created to “[effectively] balance the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the social group in which he was born” (Dewey, 1917). Therefore, governance and viability of social institutions may depend on having an effective and progressive education system.

Supporting schools to accomplish such complex tasks demands constant involvement from central education systems, particularly through the provision of different inputs like educational materials, technical support, or a qualified teaching force. An insufficient or inadequate distribution of resources will hinder the academic achievement of an ample number of students, with shortcomings disproportionately affecting socially disadvantaged groups. These inefficiencies will contribute then to deepening existent social inequalities across ethnic groups or to the institutionalization of social exclusion. Therefore, identifying possible sources of ineffectiveness in the allocation of these resources becomes a key task for administrators, political leaders, international agencies and other organizations.

Educational corruption is an important issue to be addressed because as Hallak and Poisson (2002) indicate, “corruption in the specific sphere of education…affects not only the volume of educational services (including their
quality and efficiency) but also equity in education and public confidence in educational systems." Although there are several studies describing characteristics and effects of corrupt practices in education systems, credible estimation of these effects is still scarce, mainly because of restrictions in the availability of data. Indeed, finding appropriate methodologies to measure corruption is still a pending challenge: as McMullan (1961) described, “corruption is not a subject which can be investigated openly by means of questionnaires and interviews. Even if it were, in principle, possible to quantify the phenomenon, there would be no practical possibility of doing so.”

In addition to data, addressing questions on the effects of corruption in education will require a comprehensive conceptual framework that identifies the forms of corruption and the underlying mechanisms through which they impact the delivery of education opportunities.

**Educational corruption and inefficiencies**

Inefficiency (consequence of the diversion of resources from their intended public education purposes towards private purposes or gains) is perhaps the most studied effect of educational corruption (Chua 1999; Morduchowicz, 2003; Martinez, 2004; Segal, 2004; Chapman, 2005). The result

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8 As Jacob and Levitt (2003) point out, "in the case of corruption, there is typically no clear outcome variable, making it necessary for the researcher to employ nonstandard approaches in generating such a measure."

9 A largely discussed topic in the research of corruption is precisely its effects, especially the controversy on the role of “corruption as sand” or "corruption as grease" (Seligson, 2002). McKittrick (1957), McMullan (1961) Jeff, (1964) and Huntington (1968) can be classified as authors arguing that corruption creates integration and economic development. On the other hand, authors like Caiden and Caiden (1977) emphasize that corruption has been legitimized by some scholars by ignoring that “when the wrong-doing has become the norm and the standard accepted behavior ..., notions of public responsibility and trust have become the exception and not the rule.” Recent research has focused on their negative effects (Mauro (1995, 1997, 1998), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Tanzi (1997), and Kauffman (1997)).
is typically an under-provision of essential education inputs relative to the resources budgeted to procure them, or using Okun’s (1975) metaphor, the “leaks in the bucket” in the process of redistributing resources (in this case, the funds allocated for the operation of public education systems) result from detrimental practices among public officials, like the case described by Chua (1999) in The Philippines, where under-delivery of goods represented up to 60% of the total value of public acquisition contracts.\(^{10}\) Therefore, improving efficiency in the administration of educational resources is also an important goal given the scarcity of resources in education sectors.\(^{11}\)

**Educational corruption and inequalities**

Corrupt practices may affect different areas within education systems, but as it has been reported in several developing countries, schools suffering from ineffective monitoring are a fertile place for corruption. For instance, illegal enrolment fees may easily hinder academic opportunities of children from economically disadvantaged families since they simply cannot afford to make these illegal payments to continue their education.\(^{12}\)

\(^{10}\) In just one contract reviewed, this author found that a provider delivered 111,000 fewer armchairs than promised. In the Philippines, one in every five students does not have a chair. In a similar case, up to 65% of the resources allocated for a textbook program were lost by corruption. The amount lost by the government solely in this transaction represents the cost of almost one million additional books considering that in the basic level education schools, one textbook is shared by every six pupils.

\(^{11}\) For instance, Hallak and Poisson (2002) report "surveys suggest that leakage of funds from Ministries of Education to schools represent more than 80% of the total sums allocated (non-salary expenditures) in some countries".

\(^{12}\) Anderson, Kaufmann and Recanatini (2003, in Rose-Ackerman 2004) confirm that while the rich bribe for speeding services, the poor bribe for getting access to services (among poor population, 39% of them declares that they have paid a bribe “to avoid problems”. Only 17% among the rich population declares the same). Therefore, a lack of agency, voice, and the prevalence of impunity will create conditions where access to education for the poorest population will be contingent on their economic capacity to pay bribes.
Additional evidence supports the argument that corruption has a differentiated effect across social groups with different socioeconomic conditions as corruption is a chronic disadvantage for the poorest population. For instance, Azfar and Gurgur (2001) report that in rural municipalities in the Philippines, corruption “significantly reduces the success rate of students, unlike in the case of similar urban communities." Cockroft (1998), reports that illegal enrolment fees by the amount of 10£ established by a headmistress in Tanzania deters enrollment of poor children whose parents earn only 5£ per month. In both cases illegal enrollment fees determine who gets access to education and could explain low enrollment rates in both countries.

Other authors support the argument that underserved groups are more affected by corrupt practices. Cruz (2004) found in El Salvador (where 16% of the surveyed population knows about illegal payments as a precondition to get access to educational services), people with the lowest levels of education are more prone to ignore and misunderstand the dimensions and effects of corrupt practices. A likely consequence of this lack of awareness is that the lower the educational level, the more difficult it will be for ordinary citizens to detect, denounce, and defend themselves against corrupt public officials.

On the same point, Reinikka and Svensson (2003 and 2004) describe that “schools in well endowed areas suffer less from capture [of funds] as the communities have the resources to acquire information on entitlements and

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13 An increase of one standard deviation in the index measuring corruption is associated with a 12% decrease in the number of students passing the [National Elementary Achievement Test].
exercise voice, if necessary. As a result, actual non-wage spending in education is regressive.”

The effects of corruption on inequalities may be represented using Reimers’ (2000) model of levels of educational opportunity. In Table One I have grouped different forms of corrupt practices identified in several studies, according to the level of educational opportunity that they may actually affect.

**Educational corruption and reproduction of values**

How educational corruption may be related to the reproduction of deleterious social values among students is the topic with fewer findings reported in the reviewed literature. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research on how attitudes and behaviors from teachers regarding corruption affect students’ perceptions, although it seems plausible that principals and teachers’ permissible attitudes toward corruption may be induced and reproduced among their students.

Lloyd (2001) points out how within the “hidden curriculum” (experiences beyond the formal content and classroom experience, represented mainly by “principal and teacher’s attitudes and behaviors”) lies a rich reality mirroring the social norms and values present in the community and beyond. Teachers transmit their own beliefs, values, and in some cases misconceptions on specific issues like gender bias (Anderson-Levitt, Bloch, and Soumare, 1998; Biraimah, 1980; Davidson and Kanyuka, 1992; Hyde, 1997; Lloyd and Mensch, 1999, all

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14 These authors identified that one percent increase in household income increases the amount of public funding that reaches the school by 0.25% and a similar increase in the share of qualified teachers reduces leakage [the amount of grant capitation resources that do not reach schools] by 0.27 percentage points.
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Their attitudes and behaviors will certainly influence students’ perception and attitudes toward the same issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Examples of how corrupt practices may affect educational opportunity, identified by author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunity to enroll in first grade</td>
<td><strong>Enrolment fees.</strong> Illegal enrolment fees are a deterrent for poor students. Low salaries and greed interact with the lack of voice, effective monitoring, and impunity to create additional barriers for students who can not afford paying bribes. (Cockroft, 1998; Chua, 1999; Horan, 1999; Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson, 2000; Parajuli, 2001; Azfar, 2002; Hardjono and Teggeeman 2002; Cruz, 2004, Karim, 2004; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Hallak and Poisson, 2005; Transparencia Mexicana (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunity to complete first grade with enough success to go onto the next grade</td>
<td>Teachers appointed by <em>cronyism</em> or by paying bribes are not necessarily qualified to support students, particularly those who depend completely on school resources to acquire basic skills and knowledge. (Cockroft, 1998; Chua, 1999; Bennet, 2001; Parajuli, 2001; Azfar, 2002; Fundación Este Pais, 2003; Hallak and Poisson, 2005).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunity to continue each educational cycle</td>
<td>Teachers <em>selling grades</em> or demanding bribes to provide official documents to students may foster increased dropout rates. (Horan, 1999; Heynemann, 2002; Karklins, 2002; Eckstein, 2003; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Karim, 2004; Rumyanitsveva, 2005; Lazic, 2005 in Meier and Griffin, 2005; Karosadnize and Christensen (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunity to acquire comparable skills and knowledge to peers</td>
<td><strong>Mismanagement</strong> of public resources may limit the number and quality of available educational materials, food programs, or scholarships for populations in risk. (Chua, 1999; Bennet, 2001; Azfar, 2002; Transparency Brazil, in Meier and Griffin, 2005; Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme, 1998; Chapman, 2002; Azfar, 2002; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson, 2000; Hallak and Poisson, 2002; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Cardenas, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Opportunity to expand social and economic life chances based on what one learns</td>
<td>Insufficient or <strong>inadequate educational materials</strong> resulting from diversion of public resources for private purposes. (Martinez, 2004; Chua, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Insufficient instructional time</strong> resulting from teacher absences or lack of accountability from teachers and principals (Burke, 2000 in Azfar, 2002; Bennet, 2001; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Duflo and Hanna (2005), in Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Chua, 1999; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Segal, 2004).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The National Survey on Beliefs, Attitudes and Values from Teachers and Parents in Mexico (*Fundación Este País*, 2003) provides information about some of the teachers’ attitudes that would be pernicious if transmitted to students,
especially as they might reproduce a permissive attitude toward corrupt practices. According to this survey, only 29% of the respondent teachers considered it a citizen obligation to abide by the law, and just 41% of them considered that people should *always* obey the law. Furthermore, it should be expected that teacher’s attitudes and practices (e.g. bribes for giving higher grades or demanding illegal payments to provide transcripts or diplomas) may induce or reproduce perspectives toward corruption among students and represent inadequate examples to students and parents alike. As Cox, Jaramillo and Reimers (2005) state, the presence of the teachers’ attitudes described in this survey would mean that “young people who graduate from these institutions will lack the necessary skills to become active citizens in a democracy”.

It is important to remember the role of schools in deconstructing social misperceptions, particularly in those settings where corruption is becoming a systematic and extended problem.15 Having teachers able to communicate the importance of abiding the law and the necessity for eradicating corruption is crucial, especially in settings where this phenomenon is accepted as the easiest way to achieve social mobility.16 As previous studies on civic education have showed, actions speak louder than words.

15 The institutionalization of educational corruption in some countries is reflected even in the development of a special language. Chua (1999) reports that in The Philippines the term “SOP” (standard operation procedure) means that a bribe has to be paid. The phrase “comeback at five” means that the amount of the bribe to be paid is 5,000 pesos.

16 On this point, Cruz (2004) describes that in El Salvador one out of five persons considers that the only way to get rich is to be corrupt. The main concern regarding this statistic is that among those who agreed with that statement, 33% of them are college graduates. This data is particularly worrisome considering Meier’s (2005) point on the effects of corruption in social institutions: “If people (especially the young) come to believe that school or university admission and marks can be bought, a country’s economic and political future is in jeopardy.”
III. Typologies of corrupt practices

A lack of reliable indices, methodological challenges like the endogenous relationship of corruption with poverty, or the lack of a wider involvement of international educational agencies created an important gap in the available knowledge on corruption in education.\textsuperscript{17} The majority of studies have been focused on describing observed corrupt practices and in a very limited number of cases, shedding some light on a quantitative estimation of effects of corruption in educational outcomes (like in the case of Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2000)) or on how specific interventions may reduce the incidence of corruption in educational settings, like in Reinikka (2004), Banerjee and Duflo (2005) or Jacobs and Levitt (2003).\textsuperscript{18}

Besides mapping out findings on educational corruption through the construction of a typology, an additional goal of this paper is to identify in which corrupt practices there is limited or no empirical evidence from research. This will help to identify gaps in our knowledge on the dynamics and characteristics of corrupt practices in education. While describing the different typologies, corrupt practices that have been studied beyond descriptions (including estimation of

\textsuperscript{17} Although the ETICO initiative at the International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO) is a good example of the current awareness on the importance of studying corruption, this is mostly an exception among international educational agencies. A possible explanation on the lack of involvement of international agencies in the study of corruption may be provided from Marquette (2001), who describes that for the World Bank before 1996, anticorruption initiatives “[were] seen at the time as too politically sensitive and too difficult in terms of translating into practice on the ground by the Bank’s General Counsel, senior management and the majority of Bank staff.”

\textsuperscript{18} This may be partially explained by the lack of validity corruption measurement indices. As Lambsdorff (1999) and Mazcorro (2003) describe, this is one of the main challenges in the research of corruption. On this particular aspect, Leys (1964) pointed out that there was “a widespread feeling that [regarding research of corruption] the facts can not be discovered, or that if they can, they can not be proved, or if that they can be proved, the proof cannot be published”. This statement is still partially valid and may explain the limited empirical research in the study of corruption.
effects) will be identified. Empirical studies are identified in each typology according to the notations provided in the tables.

The first typology is presented by Hallak and Poisson (2001) who based their classification on areas of management or planning where corrupt practices take place within education ministries (see Table two). This “activity based” typology includes fifteen different corrupt practices, from embezzlement to nepotism; all grouped around eight activities performed in education agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of planning/ management involved</th>
<th>Corrupt practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building of schools</td>
<td>• Fraud in public tendering, embezzlement, school mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, textbooks, food</td>
<td>• Fraud in public tendering, embezzlement, circumvention of criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher appointment/management</td>
<td>• Favoritism, nepotism, bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher behavior</td>
<td>• Ghost teachers*, bribes (for school entrance, assessment, exams, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>• Distortion of rules and procedures, inflation of costs and activities, opacity of financial flows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowances (e.g. fellowships, subsidies)</td>
<td>• Favoritism, nepotism, bribes, circumvention of criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examinations and diplomas</td>
<td>• Information selling, favoritism, nepotism, bribes, academic fraud*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information systems</td>
<td>• Data manipulation*, data selection/censorship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Practices studied in empirical research, either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices

One of the advantages of this typology is that by relating the corrupt practice to specific management activities or functions, it might be easier to identify the characteristics of the actors and the conditions surrounding the emergence of corruption as well as suggest plausible effects of corruption. For instance, it should be expected that corruption observed in key issues like
teacher hiring processes will affect a different dimension than embezzlement in
the acquisition of office supplies. Although both practices may be equally
pernicious, teacher quality has been demonstrated as a key process in achieving
an adequate distribution of educational opportunities, especially because of the
positive effect of teachers’ quality on the performance on disadvantaged children
(Reimers, 2006). A downside of utilizing this criterion to classify corrupt practices
is the huge number of activities performed in an education system as well as the
fact that for several activities, it is difficult to identify a single responsible actor.

A second typology is suggested by Chapman (2005). In this classification,
corrupt practices are grouped around the administrative level of government or
agency involved in the implementation of educational policies. Based on this
criterion, Chapman establishes five “levels of activity”: Central Ministry,
region/district, school, classroom and international agencies. Although there is no
empirical evidence on this point, it is possible to forecast that corrupt practices at
the school level will have a different effect on equity than those observed at the
central level. Furthermore, it may also help to identify variations across countries
where corrupt practices take place: for instance, while in the USA most of the
corrupt practices reported are located at the central or regional level (Segal,
2004; Fusco, 2005), in developing countries, corruption is observed also at the
school level (Cockroft (1998), Chua (1999), Reinikka and Svensson (2004),
Transparency International (2005)).

Table three describes the different practices for each category in this
typology.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Corrupt Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Ministry</td>
<td>• Kickback on construction and supply contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Favoritism in hiring, appointments, and promotions decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of funds from government accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of funds from international assistance funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ghost teachers and employees*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Requiring payment for services that should be provided free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Withholding needed approvals and signatures to extort bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Directing the location of construction and services to locations that offer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>opportunities for gain by oneself, family, or friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Requiring the use of materials as a way to create a market for items on which</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one, one’s family or friends can hold an import or production monopoly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/District</td>
<td>• Overlooking school violations on inspector visits in return for bribes or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>favors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of school supplies to private market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sales of recommendations for higher education entrance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Favoritism in personnel appointments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School level</td>
<td>• Ghost teachers*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of school fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inflation of school enrollment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Imposition of unauthorized fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of central MOE funds allocated*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of monies in revolving textbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Diversion of community contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom/teacher</td>
<td>• Siphoning of school supplies and textbooks to local market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selling test scores and course grades*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selling change of grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selling grade-to-grade promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Selling admissions (especially to higher education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creating the necessity for private tutoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Teachers’ persistent absenteeism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Agencies</td>
<td>• Payment of bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Payment of excessive or unnecessary fees to obtain services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Skimming from project funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Allocating (or acquiescing in the allocation of) project related opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on the basis of candidates’ connections rather than on merit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Practices studied in empirical research, either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices

A third typology found in the literature review is the classification suggested by Rumyantseva (2005). Focusing on corruption in higher education institutions, she defines a classification criterion based on “student participation.” Under this classification, there are two big groups of corrupt practices: practices
where students are “directly” affected\(^{19}\) as well as what this author distinguishes as “administrative” corrupt practices (observed in procurement, hiring or financial areas), where students are not “directly” affected, except of course for the reduced availability of resources.

Table 4. Typology of “educational specific corruption” (Rumyantseva, 2005)

| Student–faculty exchange | • Student offers money for examination grade that professor accepts and gives a good grade to the student although he or she does not know the subject.  
|                         | • Faculty member sells a student a term paper.  
|                         | • Professor intentionally gives a low grade to a student and recommends tutoring after classes. Later he/she passes the student regardless of how much the student learned |
| Student–administrator exchange | • An administrator “helps” a slow learner to obtain good grades in all subjects by ordering relevant faculty members to grade him or her favorably. Student pays an administrator a "service fee."  
|                         | • Administrator charges student’s family a fee for guaranteed admission to his or her university.  
|                         | • Administrator charges student a fee for guaranteed access to the university dormitory with limited space availability, allowing student to bypass the official process. |
| Student–staff exchange | • A librarian charges student a fee for the right to borrow a book when the number of copies of this book is limited.  
|                         | • An administrative assistant charges a student for transcripts that are supposed to be free of charge.  
|                         | • Student services representative charges a student a fee for guaranteed tickets of limited availability to a major recreational event. |

\(^{19}\) Practices studied in empirical research, either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices.

Although considering the “victimization” of students as the criterion to classify corrupt practices may help to identify direct effects of corruption for the main actors in education systems, it may also be difficult to disentangle the effects of “administrative” from “student involved” corrupt practices, especially when empirical research on the effects of corruption is very limited. Table four describes the practices considered by this author as “educational specific corruption” or “student involved” practices. Finally, Azfar (2003) provides a fourth

\(^{19}\) Student’s “values, beliefs and life chances” are compromised because of corruption.
The typology to be suggested in this literature review is built upon the models previously described. The criterion for grouping corrupt practices is based on the role of actors participating in the design and implementation of educational policies, categorized based on a principal-agent model, an approach frequently used in the analysis of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988).

Table 5. Typology based on the “nature of corruption” (Azfar, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student-Teacher</th>
<th>Payer-school</th>
<th>School-supplier</th>
<th>Within school/ministry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Bribes for admission</td>
<td>• Ghost schools for processing vouchers</td>
<td>• Kickbacks for purchase orders of textbooks, equipment, supplies, meals and cleaning services</td>
<td>• Sale of jobs and promotions and transfers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bribes for grades and promotions</td>
<td>• Inflating number of students to get reimbursements</td>
<td>• Bribes for approval of textbooks</td>
<td>• Theft of funds*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Induced demand for private tuitions</td>
<td>• Loan officers bribed to give loans to rich students or non-students</td>
<td>• Board members bribed by publishing houses for selecting their textbooks</td>
<td>• Theft of supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Absenteeism*</td>
<td>• Students who stay in university for decades to collect stipends</td>
<td>• Bribes for turning blind eye to photocopying textbooks and violating intellectual property</td>
<td>• Fraudulent billing for expenses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Teaching badly</td>
<td>• Sale of exams and bribes for letting professional exam takers take exams for students</td>
<td>• Kickbacks for construction</td>
<td>• Under-allocation of funds to education*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Practices studied in empirical research, either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices
Table 6. Analytical Framework to Identify Components of Corrupt Practices (based on Klitgaard’s model (1988))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Level</th>
<th>Central Educational Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Actors**   | Agent: school principals, teachers  
Principal: supervisor | Agent: public officials, supervisors  
Principal: top politicians, supervisors, administrators |
| **Assigned Activities** | Instruction | Organization of service, administration, planning, supervision, curriculum |
| **Corrupt Practices** | Bribes, cronyism, non-performance of duties, kleptocracy | Kleptocracy, supplies, bribes, cronyism, non-performance of duties, nepotism |
| **Factors Creating Monopoly Conditions** | Location, distance to other schools, cost of private education, parent’s assigned value to education, collusion among principals. | Legal mandate to provide public education, lack of incentives to attract students, lack of performance-based systems, natural monopoly condition (widespread education infrastructure), unaffordable private education options |
| **Factors Influencing Agent’s Discretion** | Unclear rules for teachers, lack of peer monitoring/guidance, environment of impunity, perception of teaching as a temporary profession, salaries and social rewards | Vague rules for guiding public officials performance, lack of peer monitoring/guidance, lawless environment, perception of public administration activities as a corrupt/profitable activity |
| **Accountability** | Centralized policymaking process neglecting teachers’ participation, ensuring parent’s lack of voice and participation by controlling politicians and teachers; lack of control in schools | Centralized policymaking process neglecting administrators’ participation, ensuring administrator’s lack of voice and participation by controlling politicians; inadequate control of administrators in educational agencies |

* Classification based on Caiden et al. (2001).

A principal-agent relationship arises when a “principal” remunerates an “agent” to perform certain activities. However, typically the principal has only limited information about the agent’s actions. A result of this information asymmetry is that it is often possible for the agent to act in a way that is personally beneficial but is detrimental to the interest of the principal. The principal in education policies is the government education agency.

The challenge for the principal is to design a set of incentives and a monitoring strategy such that the interest of the agents is to act in a way that furthers the goals of the principal. It is often difficult for principals responsible for providing educational services to meet this challenge. Hence, corruption results
as agents misbehave. Table eight describes how a single actor can have a role as a principal or as an agent depending on the origin of the policy implemented.

The different roles of the actors described in Table six are also pictured in Figure number one, where for our model, parents and students are considered as principals (P₁) and politicians as agents (A₁). A similar relationship can also be observed between international agencies functioning as the principal (P₂) and the ministry of education as the agent (A₂). This relationship is also found between educational administrators (P₃), (including supervisors for simplicity of analysis), and teachers or principals (A₃).

Figure 1. Principal-agents’ relationships across different actors and policies.

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20 An important assumption in the study of corruption based on the principal-agent approach is that public laws enact the “public interest” and deter the misuse of public resources. Public laws then constitute the basis of an agreement between principals (e.g., people, politicians, or parents) and agents (e.g., public officials, supervisors, or teachers) to provide a service. A deviation from this agreement in order to obtain private benefits will then result in corrupt practices. In this case, information asymmetry (moral hazard) may allow an agent to obtain personal benefits beyond accorded remuneration.
The typology suggested in this literature review is quite simple. It only includes two different levels where corruption practices are identified, one within the school (teachers/principals as agents (A3)) and the second at the central administration level (A1 and A2).

Further empirical research would be needed to identify how corrupt practices would impact different dimensions (like equity or reproduction of practices) depending on the level where corruption is identified.

a) Corruption at the central level

Corruption at the central or regional level in education agencies is similar to practices reported in other areas like defense or public works: embezzlement, cronyism, diversion of funds, ghost workers, and illegal overpayments. For the purpose of this paper, I will consider as a part of the central level not just the top administrators of educational systems, but also the administrative levels outside the school (regional offices and supervisors). The logic for this division is a personal assumption on the fact that corrupt practices observed at the school level will have a different impact than practices observed at the central level, especially on issues of equity and reproduction of corruption.

Table seven includes a list of corrupt practices reported in the central level of educational systems, organized around types of corrupt practices suggested by Caiden (2001). The following paragraphs will briefly describe the information on the dynamics of two corrupt practices: the hiring and promotion of teachers and the intentional misapplication of rules or regulation.
Hiring and promotion of teachers

It is striking to observe that key processes for the operation of education systems may be pervaded with corruption, like in the case of teacher hiring and promotion. Chua (1999) provides a good description of the dynamics surrounding the processes of appointment and promotion of teachers in the Philippines: in order to be hired, teachers must get principals’ approval for a job application; without paying them a bribe, their odds of getting a position are minimal. Later, once a teacher is appointed, their first check must be sent to the supervisor if they want to avoid problems and aspire to be promoted in the future. These practices are assumed as a normal condition in the administration of educational systems. According to this author, it is not unusual for teacher candidates to become maids, laundrywoman or mistresses of principals and supervisors in order to get an appointment. Experience and academic background are the last criteria to be considered in the hiring process.

A similar situation is reported in Mexico: in a relatively recent survey (Fundacion Este Pais, 2003), 60% of teachers in this country admitted that positions are distributed through bribes. This may be explained through a political

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21 Although there was no reference on this practice in countries like the US, an early report from the Citizen’s Association of New York described how this practice affected the Forth Ward schools in NY. Segal (2004) also describes a case of cronyism on the process of hiring teachers: “One school board member who was being secretly recorded summed up the way some New York City school boards used to pick principals and other schools staff: “you could have been Albert Einstein and it would not make a difference. Unqualified? Qualified? […]. That is my recommendation. The district has to hire them so long as “they are not illiterate or deformed or something the matter with them.”

22 New hires pay from 3,000 to 5,000 pesos per post.

23 This check is considered as a “donation” to the district, supposedly to be used in maintenance of schools.
concession to the teachers’ union: in 18 out of 32 states, teachers’ union leaders decide who will be hired in at least 50% of the newly created positions, most of the time without any publicly known evaluation process.\textsuperscript{24}

**Procurement/acquisition of goods**

The huge amount of resources devoted to education in several countries as well as the dispersion of final users of goods like educational materials make difficult the auditing or verification of an efficient and adequate acquisition of goods.\textsuperscript{25} Although there are effective instruments to monitor the distribution and acquisition of educational materials like the Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004), it seems that the manipulation of regulation and supplies still remains as one of the most common corrupt practices in education agencies, according to the reviewed literature. Martinez (2004) describes a typical case of favoritism in procurement areas: a former manager of a big printing company appointed as a public official at the National Free Textbook Commission in Mexico, is responsible for the authorization of contracts for printing Mexican free textbooks.

\textsuperscript{24} In a public electronic forum, the Secretary of Education of a northern state in Mexico described this situation: “About the distribution of new teachers’ positions, we have the faculty to allocate only half of the teacher positions, and the other half corresponds to the teachers’ union. Our 50 percent is allocated based on candidates’ academic grades and the rest is decided by the teachers’ union. The union has their own rules to distribute these positions, [if you are interested in getting a teacher position] I would suggest you to visit the union leaders” (“Minute of the electronic forum with the State Secretary of Education, Alejandro Bahena Flores”, August 21, 2003, retrieved on February 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2006 at the link: http://www.bajacalifornia.gob.mx/portal/chat/chat_transcript14.jsp).

\textsuperscript{25} In the Mexican Ministry of Education, a survey identified 206 administrative procedures where there is a possibility of finding corrupt practices. 66% of these procedures belong to areas associated with procurement (SEP, 2002).
### Table 7. Corrupt practices at the Ministry level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types (Caiden, 2001)</th>
<th>Description of practices reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B. Bribery and graft; extortion, illegal levies; kickbacks.</td>
<td>- Bribe to get a position as teacher (Cockroft, 1998; Chua, 1999; Bennet, 2001; Parajuli, 2001; Azfar, 2002*; Fundación Este País, 2003*; Hallak and Poisson, 2002).&lt;br&gt;- Bribe to be promoted once a teacher has been appointed (Chua, 1999; Tanaka, 2001; Azfar, 2002*; Eckstein, 2003).&lt;br&gt;- Bribe to clear withheld approvals/signatures (Chapman, 2002).&lt;br&gt;- Kickback and bribe in the acquisition of low quality or nonexistent goods or services (Chua, 1999; Tanaka, 2001; Chapman, 2002; Eckstein, 2003; Segal, 2004; Levacic and Peters, 2004).&lt;br&gt;- Sales of recommendations for students to enter higher education institutions (Chapman, 2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Manipulation of regulations and supplies; bias and favoritism in decision making.</td>
<td>- Embezzlement in the acquisition of services/goods, overpricing, over billing, low quality (Bennet, 2001; Parajuli, 2001; Azfar, 2002*; Hallak and Poisson, 2002; Martínez, 2004; Segal, 2004*; Aragon, 2005, in Meier and Griffin, 2005).&lt;br&gt;- Extortion, requiring use of educational materials as a way to create a market for items on which one, one’s family or friends can hold an import or production monopoly (Chapman, 2002).&lt;br&gt;- Ordering from friendly companies or contracting with companies directed by relatives (Levacic and Peters, 2004; Martínez, 2004).&lt;br&gt;- Ghost consultants and ghost teachers in training (Segal, 2004*).&lt;br&gt;- Donations compensated with additional contracts (Martínez, 2004).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Empirical studies either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices.*
Table 7. Corrupt practices at the Ministry level (Continued...)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (Caiden, 2001)</th>
<th>Description of practices reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. Non performance of duties; desertion;</td>
<td>• Overlooking school violations or teacher absenteeism on inspector visits in return for bribes or favors (Chapman, 2002, Azfar, 2002*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parasitism; cronyism.</td>
<td>• Favoritism/nepotism in hiring, appointments, and promotions decisions (Chapman, 2002; Hallak and Poisson, 2002; Martinez, 2004; Segal, 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005; Lazic, 2005 in Meier and Griffin, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Falsification of qualifications, academic titles or grades (Chua, 1999, Horan, 1999; Cardenas, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ghost teachers (Chapman, 2002; Hallak and Poisson, 2002; Morduchowicz, 2003; Cardenas, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deception in evaluation of public educational agencies’ performance (Martinez, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hiring as public officials professionals representing regulated businesses in conflict of interest (Martinez, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Collusion among workers to get paid unjustified extra-hours (Segal, 2004*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public officials coauthoring guides or textbooks that will represent benefits for them later (Segal, 2004;* Chua, 1999*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accepting employments from private businesses related to the MOE (Chua, 1999*; Segal, 2004*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Distorted school mapping, situation responding to personal interests (Hallak and Poisson, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Academic fraud explaining unjustified credentials (Hallak and Poisson, 2002; Karosadnize and Christensen (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bypassing of criteria in the allocation of subsidies (Hallak and Poisson, 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Misconduct on assessment systems, manipulation of tests by administrators (Eckstein, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fake teachers’ diplomas (Horan, 1999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Empirical studies either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices
According to this author, the company where this public official used to work obtained several contracts, including one for printing three million books of mathematics for primary students. Martinez (2004) confirmed that as a consequence of the unilateral decision and the unfair competition for other printer companies, the books were overpriced and their quality proved inadequate.  

Corruption at the school level

Based on the literature reviewed, corrupt practices at the school level could have the most deleterious consequences. Identifying effective ways to diminish corruption in education reproduces important questions regarding an important issue about inequalities in the distribution of educational opportunities: how can our education systems improve the distribution of opportunities when the poorest population is unaware of the importance and benefits of education and exhibit a lack of agency required to demand and obtain better services?

Table eight includes a list of corrupt practices reported at the school level. From this table, it is possible to identify at least two important areas affecting the operation of schools. These practices are the existence of illegal enrollment fees and bribes as well as teacher absenteeism. The dynamics of these corrupt practices will be also explained in the following paragraphs. Empirical studies are identified through the notation mentioned in the same table.

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Furthermore, this author describes an additional grave consequence: due to the collusion of public officials and printers, there was an ineffective monitoring on the quality and characteristics of the textbooks. When the Ministry of Education distributed books to students, several books included pornographic images in some of its pages. An investigation discovered that the printing company was also the printer for a pornographic publication and there had been “a mistake.” In spite of the investigation, none of the public officials involved in this problem was fired or sanctioned.
Illegal enrollment fees and bribes

Hardjono and Teggeman (2002) describe how illegal fees and bribes may contribute to reproducing inequalities in the education system. Hidden fees—essentially bribes—for additional “study modules” and “voluntary” contributions to help [nonexistent] orphan students, among others, are common and could determine who will attain additional academic grades or who will be enrolled in school.

The logic is quite simple. Given that in several developing countries there are a limited number of schools in a determined region, enrolling in a different school is almost impossible, unless parents are willing to travel to other communities or pay additional transportation costs. On the other hand, ineffective monitoring and bureaucratic practices like the fact that relevant documents like student transcripts can only be obtained through teachers, principals and public officials, thereby creating a monopolistic situation and increasing the opportunities of extorting parents. Faced with the decision of paying or dropping out of school, parents will be forced (if they can afford it) to pay and reduce future problems.

An additional aspect to be considered besides the prevalent impunity is the role teachers have in communities as well as the traditions in the administration of schools that survive in several developing countries. Unlike several developed countries, there is a common assumption that parents do not have a voice regarding the operation of schools. In other words, schools are solely the responsibility of teachers and administrators which increases their power.
Teacher absenteeism

Based on the work of Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), it is possible to argue that teacher absenteeism is one of the most common corrupt practices observed in education. It also seems to reproduce patterns where the poorest population is more frequently affected by this practice.\(^{27}\)

One of the possible explanations is the difficulty of effectively monitoring schools in isolated regions. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) describe an interesting experiment conducted in India by the NGO Seva Mandir. Based on a “tamper-proof camera,” teachers submit a photo taken daily with their children in order to be able to receive a monetary incentive. The effects of this intervention have been evaluated and show a decrease in teacher absenteeism rates in schools with this intervention, suggesting that ineffective incentives and monitoring may explain the prevalence of teacher absenteeism.

Besides the limitation supervisors face in visiting schools and verifying the attendance of teachers (making them to rely on principals, who often are either colluded with teachers or face a limited capacity to sanction teachers who are not complying with their duties), parents also have limited options for complaining about irresponsible teachers. This situation can be characterized using Hirschman’s (1971) model: especially in the poorest regions, a parent could lack the agency to exercise their voice, and exit is not an option given that often there are no other schools in which to enroll students.

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\(^{27}\) Based on the information collected through the national test administered to a sample of Mexican primary school students in 2003, it is possible to estimate a strong correlation between the number of students reporting teacher absenteeism and their socioeconomic status, measured by parents’ educational attainment.
A final step in complementing the typology of corrupt practices is to identify the main gaps in our knowledge on corrupt practices. Identifying methodologies used in the study of corruption in education settings as well as highlighting those practices that have been acknowledged but not empirically studied will help to understand what has been already discussed in the literature, how well some questions have been addressed, and also help to identify relevant questions for future research.

In order to address previous questions, the methodologies applied in previous research will be explained in the rest of this section. Two bodies of literature were found (Tables nine and ten). The first body examines and discusses corruption in educational management through the description, either from a journalistic or from an academic perspective, but all through qualitative research. Given the methodological issues around the measurement of corruption, this type of literature is the most common.

This literature provides information on the frequency, characteristics, and plausible effects of corrupt practices, defining areas with a higher exposure to corruption as well as the actors involved. It also helps to obtain information on possible patterns on the emergence of corruption, like salaries, over-regulation, perceptions toward corruption, or parental involvement.

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28 Previous research suggests that media is a valid source of information (Del Castillo, 2001).
29 Cockroft (1998); Chua (1999); Hallak and Poisson (2001); Segal (2004); Martinez (2004), are some exponents of this type of research.
### Table 8: Corrupt practices at the school level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (Caiden, 2001)</th>
<th>Description of practices reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **A. Kleptocracy; privatization of public funds; larceny and stealing.** | - Misappropriation of parent’s donations or school funds by teachers or principals (Chua, 1999; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Ming, 2001)  
- Teachers retaining scholarships granted to poor children (Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002)  
- Use of school property for personal benefits (Heynemann, 2002; Levacic and Downes, 2004)  
- School money diverted (Levacic and Downes, 2004; Ming, 2001, Reinnika and Svensson, 2004)  
- Distributing less food than mandatory (Waite and Allen, 2003) |
| **B. Bribery and graft; extortion, illegal levies; kickbacks.** | - Illegal school enrolment fees, teachers and principals solicit bribes for admitting students or hidden fees (construction fees, educational materials) (Cockroft, 1998; Chua, 1999; Horan, 1999; Gupta, Davoody and Tiongson, 2000*; Parajuli, 2001; Azfar, 2002*; Hardjono and Teggeman 2002; Cruz, 2004, Karim, 2004; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Hallak and Poisson, 2005; Transparencia Mexicana (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005))  
- Bribes:  
  1. To get better grades (Horan, 1999; Heynemann, 2002; Karklins, 2002; Eckstein, 2003; Levacic and Downes, 2004; Karim, 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005; Lazic, 2005 in Meier and Griffin, 2005; Karosadnize and Christensen (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005)  
  2. To be included in free lunch programs (Karim, 2004)  
  3. To take exams (Karim, 2004)  
  4. To invigilators and examiners, to get advantages in examination (Greaney, 1995; Eckstein, 2003; ANLC-TI (2005) in Meier and Griffin, 2005;)  
  5. To process transcripts (Parajuli, 2001; Hardjono and Teggeman 2002)  
  6. To be admitted in higher education institutions (Heynemann, 2002; Rumyantseva, 2005 Karosadnize and Christensen (2005), in Meier and Griffin, 2005)  
  7. To get approval from supervisors (Waite and Allen, 2003)  
  8. To get approval to install drink and snack vendor machines at schools (Waite and Allen, 2003)  
  9. To be seated in the first rows of a crowded classroom (Bennet, 2001)  
  10. To get exams in advance (Azfar, 2002)  
  11. To correct students’ exercises (Bennet, 2001)  
- Mandatory sale of shoes as part of a school uniform- the owner of the only factory producing these shoes is Suharto's grandson (Horan, 1999)  
- Selling stolen exams, sexual harassment in exchange for the examination questions. (Bennet, 2001; Azfar, 2002; Eckstein, 2003)  
- Private tutoring as blackmail (Biswal, 1999; Bennet, 2001; Bray, 2003)  
- Sale of illegal educational materials as blackmail for parents (Hardjono and Teggeman 2002)  
- Unpaid child labor, teacher taking students to his farm. (Bennet, 2001) |

* Empirical studies either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices
### Table 8. Corrupt practices at the school level (continued…)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type (Caiden, 2001)</th>
<th>Description of practices reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| C. Manipulation of regulations and supplies; bias and favoritism in decision making. | • Sale of overpriced mandatory uniforms (Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002).  
• Sale of overpriced books and/or educational materials (Heynemann, 2002) |
| D. Non-performance of duties; desertion; parasitism; cronyism. | • Cheating on state test to boost results and get incentives (Chua, 1999; Jacob and Levit, 2003*; Eckstein, 2003)  
• Teacher absenteeism.  
  1. Absenteeism rates of 32% in Pakistan (Burke, 2000 in Azfar, 2002)  
  2. Absenteeism rates of up to 70% in the poorest countries (Bennet, 2001)  
  3. Absenteeism rates of 24% in India (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005)  
  4. Absenteeism rates of 36% in Udaipur, Rajasthan (Duflo and Hanna, 2005*), in Banerjee and Duflo, 2005*)  
• Absenteeism is also reported in The Philippines (Chua, 1999)  
• Absenteeism reported in (Levacic and Downes, 2004)  
• 20% of salaries were paid to ghosts in Uganda, Honduras 14%, India 23%, Peru 13%, Uganda 26%, Zambia 17% (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004*)  
• Absenteeism, leaving early from job (Segal, 2004*)  
• Teachers teach only half of the curriculum during the school day in order to be demanded as private tutors during afternoons as a sort of blackmail. (Bray, 2003)  
• Hiring excessive teachers (Morduchowicz, 2003)  
• Excessive and unjustified medical leaves (Morduchowicz, 2003)  
• Misreporting class size, attendance records and school enrollment to hide declining enrollment or to increase the number of positions and earnings (Morduchowicz, 2003; Waite and Allen, 2003; Levacic and Peters, 2004) |

* Empirical studies either designed as experiments, quasi-experiments or providing analysis beyond a description of corrupt practices
An example of this type of research is found in Hardjono and Teggeman (2002). They depict some of the effects and the mechanics through which corrupt public officials abuse citizens, and the authors point out some of the conditions fostering the existence of corrupt practices.\textsuperscript{30} Even though it is an illustrative example of the type of conducts that could certainly be affecting several countries, its scope regarding effects of corruption in education is very limited and does not provide further information on the effects in the quality of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Qualitative studies about corrupt practices in education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Author</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bennet (2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chapman (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chua (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cockroft (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hallak and Poisson (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardjono and Teggeman (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heynneman (2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Horan (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karim (2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Santizo and Cabrero (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levacic (2004)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ming (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morduchowicz (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumyantseva (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waite and Allen (2003)</td>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{30} They use a diagnostic survey that provides insights on the dynamics of corruption in Indonesia.
Another important contribution is the work of Segal (2004). As a former employee of a public agency in charge of monitoring performance of schools and districts regarding the use of public resources, she had an opportunity to document and analyze corrupt practices in the United States public education system. In fact, this approach had been used as a possible source of information (using the number of sanctioned public officials as a proxy of corruption level), but her work includes also a description of the conditions surrounding corrupt practices (i.e. nepotism that after some time is translated into fraud or absenteeism). Her work provides excellent insight on the dynamics of corruption, providing information for the possible use of government and judiciary archives for studying corruption in education.

Tanaka (2001) provides a model to anticipate corruption in education. His anticipatory model describes some of the possible areas in education systems exposed to corruption, including a definition of the actors, possible types of corruption, vulnerable areas, and measures to be implemented in order to reduce exposed spaces to corruption in education. This work is one of the few references found in the study of corruption from an educational research perspective.

The second body of literature includes empirical studies that attempt to demonstrate effects of corruption on educational outcomes using quantitative methods. In this case, the main goal is to find reports on estimated effects of corruption on educational outcomes, mainly through the use of quasi-experimental

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31 Mauro, (1998); Gupta et al. (2000), and Reinikka and Smith, (2004) are examples in this category.
designs (like in the case of Mauro (1998), Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2001)) or experimental designs (like those reported by Banerjee and Duflo (2005)).

Mauro (1998) studied the effect of corruption in the composition of public expenditure, concluding that expenditure in public education will be reduced by decisions of public officials who will decide to invest in areas with higher illegal profits. In other words, from the point of view of corrupt officials, it is easier to get benefits from the acquisition of goods in other areas than education; consequently, they decide to “invest” more according to their interests of obtaining economic benefits.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10. Quantitative studies about corrupt practices in education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banerjee and Duflo (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob and Levitt (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauro (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinikka and Svensson (2003, 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2001), using a corruption index, established that an increase in corruption is negatively associated with a decrease in literacy rates, enrollment, and persistence through 5th grade. On the other hand, student dropout rates are also shown to increase because of an expansion in corrupt practices. This study is one of the few studies estimating direct effects of corruption on educational outcomes. Another example of the second body of literature is the

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32 In both cases of quasi-experimental designs, authors rely on the use of instrumental variables design as their identification strategy. Mauro’s model has been frequently used and cited in later research on the effects of corruption.
work by Azfar and Gurgur (2001) who studied the impact of corruption in the education and health sectors of The Philippines. Based on the IVE approach developed by Mauro (1998), they estimate some of the effects of corruption on students’ scores and households’ satisfaction with public schools.

Most of the published works had to rely on media reports, judicial archives or direct observation. However, although the information provided in most cases allows one to understand the dynamics of these practices as well as to identify the main actors involved, there is a disadvantage regarding the possibility of estimating the direct effects of corrupt practices on educational outcomes. This limitation is a critical issue when considering that this type of studies would be a very powerful means of increasing the interest of international agencies on this topic as well as promoting more aggressive interventions to diminish corruption in educational settings.

An important work addressing the lack of information on corrupt practices in education is found in Reinkka and Svensson (2002). Based on the argument that “micro-level tools are needed to reveal and understand provider behavior and the translation of public spending into services, both in terms of the quantity and quality of services,” the authors designed a “diagnostic public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) and a more comprehensive facility-based quantitative service delivery survey (QSDS).” These studies have helped to identify conducts affecting the operation of education systems, like absenteeism and “ghost workers” as well as the deviation of funds that should have reached schools. These surveys are a feasible way to address the problem of the lack of information, even though the authors have
limited the presentation of the results from these surveys (including the measurement of effects of interventions like the use of a newspaper campaign to fight corruption (Reinikka and Svensson (2004))). These authors have made an important contribution to the study of corruption in education, providing indirect sources of information regarding school activities and community perceptions and establishing effects of corruption through the analysis of the impact of focused information campaigns.

An important point to highlight on the literature reviewed and the typologies described is that as there is a very limited number of empirical studies explaining dynamics, actors, effects, and credible estimating consequences of corruption: only 7 out of 27 corrupt practices observed at the central level have been studied beyond a basic description, and 4 out of 16 corrupt practices observed at school level have been studied empirically. This may illustrate how limited our knowledge on the effects of educational corruption is and the possible paths for further research.

**III. Implications for Policy and Future research**

Hallak and Poisson (2002, in Bray, 2003) point out that according to the World Education Forum (UNESCO, 2000), “corruption is a major drain on the effective use of resources for education and should be drastically curbed.” An important contribution of the research of corruption in education should be not just describing characteristics of corrupt practices (helpful knowledge when looking for political support to fight corruption), but also providing helpful information on their effects to policy makers.
One of the topics frequently reported in the literature is the description of causes and consequences of corrupt practices. Although these findings will be influenced by the methodological approaches and the type of data utilized in their analysis, the available information on these two concepts still represents a basic source of information and evidence that may inform the design and implementation of anti-corruption policies.

Although the type and quality of findings varies across the reviewed studies, it is possible to identify common suggestions on both areas. Table 13 describes the main causes and effects reported by this author.\textsuperscript{33} From the causes reported, (although further research is needed to establish a credible causal relationship), it is possible to identify the lack of access to information, administrative burden, ineffective monitoring systems, and the lack of a set of values that should be considered by public officials. Some of these aspects will be explained in more detail later in this section.

Information found in the literature may also help to understand ways which have already been explored on the plausible effects of corruption. Particularly relevant would be studying effects of corruption on access and student achievement, but this is a demanding challenge considering the type of information required to conduct this type of analysis.

\textsuperscript{33} It is important to mention that most of these effects and causes are not supported by quantitative research; they are mostly inferred from direct observations and evidence collected through interviews, questionnaires and participant observation.
From the information presented in Table eleven on the consequences of educational corruption, effects on efficiencies and inequalities stand out as the most commonly addressed effects.

### Table 11. Reported Causes and Effects of Corrupt Practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low salaries.</strong> (Hallak and Poisson, 2001; Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002)</td>
<td><strong>Higher costs, inefficiencies.</strong> (Bennet 2000, in Azfar, 2002; Chapman, 2005; Chua, 1999; Gupta <em>et al</em>, 2000; Schleifer and Vishny, 1993; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Martinez, 2004; Segal, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ineffective monitoring.</strong> (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Jimenez and Sawada, 2001; Hallak and Poisson, 2001; Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002; Ming (2001); Morduchowicz (2003); Ochse (2004); Segal, 2004)</td>
<td><strong>Unequal distribution of opportunities.</strong> (Chapman, 2005; Cockroft, 1998; Greaney, 1995; Martinez, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson; Rumyantseva, 2005; Segal, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ineffective or complicated regulation.</strong> (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Morduchowicz (2003); Ochse (2004); Segal, 2004)</td>
<td><strong>Reproduction of malpractices.</strong> (Bennet 2001; Chapman, 2005; Greaney, 1995; Rumyantseva, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ineffective regulation.</strong> (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Morduchowicz (2003); Ochse (2004); Segal, 2004)</td>
<td><strong>Inadequate services, inadequate distribution of inputs.</strong> (Bennet 2001; Bjorkman, 2003; Chua, 1999; Hallak and Poisson, 2001; Reinikka and Svensson, Segal, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public official capacities.</strong> (Bennet, 2001; Chua, 1999; Heynneman, 2001; Ochse, 2004)</td>
<td><strong>Lower quality.</strong> (Chua, 1999; Hallak and Poisson, 2001; Jacob and Levitt, 2003; Segal, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political instability and political retribution.</strong> (Hallak and Poisson, 2001; Martinez, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from users as a way to control public officials. Other authors point out the role of the media, increasing salaries of teachers and administrators, or even the modification of curriculums to include a content condemning these practices. Table twelve lists several suggested interventions as basic knowledge that may guide future design of anti-corruption policies. From these interventions, community involvement and improving regulation and access to information are the most cited recommendations.

Table 12. Recommendations

- Collecting information from users. (Azfar, 2002)
- Random evaluations and pilot studies of interventions (Azfar, 2002)
- Increasing media coverage (Azfar, 2002)
- Increasing salaries (Azfar, 2002; Chua, 1999)
- Forensic audits (Azfar, 2002)
- Community involvement (Azfar, 2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Bennet, 2001; Chua, 1999; Di Gropello, 2006; Gupta, Davodi and Tiongson, 2000; Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002; Karim, 2003)
- Promote more research (Azfar, 2002)
- Improving measurement systems (Azfar, 2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005)
- Improving monitoring systems (Azfar, 2002; Chua, 1999; Karim, 200)
- Improving incentives systems (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005)
- Improving communication/information systems (Bjorkman, 2003; Hardjono and Teggeman, 2002; Reinikka, 2004)
- Improving regulation (Bray, 2003; Di Gropello, 2006; Reinikka, 2004)
- Privatization (Chua, 1999; Davodi and Tiongson, 2000)
- Modify curriculum. (Chua, 1999)
- Decentralization (Di Gropello, 2006)
- Improving training of public officials (Levacic, 2004)
- Identifying susceptible areas for corruption (Tanaka, 2001)

Beyond the specific recommendations provided in the literature is the lack of research that may indeed estimate the impact of interventions. As suggested by Azfar (2002), random evaluations and pilot projects may be the type of research that could provide useful information for decision makers. Indeed, Banerjee and Duflo (2005) have provided insightful information on how to address issues like teacher absenteeism with promising results. However, among the challenges for future
research of educational corruption is not just increasing the use of quantitative methods and availability of information, but conducting research that may be translated into evidence to inform the implementation of effective policies against corruption.

Understanding how educational corruption emerges and evolves requires a model that can take into consideration the effectiveness of institutions in the control of corruption. The following tables summarize key characteristics around reported corrupt practices, based on a model proposed by Klitgaard (1985).

Robert Klitgaard utilized a metaphor to describe conditions associated with the emergence and prevalence of corruption. Under this popular model, corruption is explained as a function of the existence of Monopoly plus Discretion minus Accountability (C=M+D-A). Based on this representation, it would be possible to assume that any corrupt practice might be understood by identifying sources of monopoly ("over a good or a service"), discretion (unclear or excessive regulation grants the power to public officials to decide who and what kind of service a citizen will get), and effectiveness of accountable political institutions- in other words, who is responsible for government interventions. As an example, Kiltgaard’s model may help to explain the emergence of corrupt practices in the teacher hiring process: this process usually depends on individual decisions made only by a reduced number of public officials without clear rules (monopoly); there is a lack of meritocratic and transparent system of appointment and promotion (discretion); \(^3\) there is also a lack

\(^3\)In Mexico, 19 out of 32 states hire teachers without an evaluation system in place (Guevara y Gonzalez, 2004). The selection of new teachers is frequently due to political recommendations, through negotiations with union leaders, or based on interests of local authorities.
of transparency, incentives, and means to evaluate performance, in addition to a structural inability to reduce corruption (accountability).\footnote{For instance, detecting an ineffective teacher hired due to corrupt practices may take several years in contexts where they enjoy automatic tenure and cannot be evaluated. In Michoacán, Mexico, 25 school teachers were hired after presenting false diplomas and academic credentials. They were discovered not because of reports of underperformance, but because of an external \textit{administrative} audit.}

Based on this model, Tables thirteen, fourteen and fifteen summarize the main conditions associated with these three components of Klitgaard’s model “explaining” corruption, specifically in the context of the administration of educational models and using corrupt practices reported in the literature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Creating Monopoly Conditions</th>
<th>1. Limited number of schools. Parents are defenseless to abuses from teachers because if parents opt to denounce a corrupt teacher or principal, they will probably have to move to a different community or face consequences regarding grading or teachers’ attitudes toward their children.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Excessive demand: Automatic life-long tenure and a lack of performance evaluation create incentives to become teachers among normal school graduates. A limited supply of teacher positions increases the odds for requesting and paying bribes. In a similar venue, parents trying to place their children in the only or better school of their community may be willing to pay bribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Normal schools and formal requirements to become a teacher. Attending normal schools as a prerequisite to become a teacher may create conditions to demand bribes in order to get a position. Given the specialization of graduates from this type of schools, it would be difficult to switch to a different professional activity, increasing the odds of being exposed to corrupt practices from public officials controlling the allocation of job positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Concentrated faculties. The power of decision-making on important issues lies with a limited number of public officials, as described by Martinez (2004): The central ministry of education is the only institution authorized to print textbooks. Although efficiency is a common argument for centralized procedures, concentration of resources and faculties reduces competition and increases the possibility of being “captured” by large printing companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Lack of citizen councils or collective decisions. The fact that a single public official takes decisions on big procurement contracts fosters corruption. Lack of citizen committees or external observers increases discretion.</td>
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</table>
### Table 14. Examples of factors associated to “discretion” conditions on described corrupt practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Influencing Agent’s Discretion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Concentration of faculties on teachers.</strong> Teachers have an uncontested faculty to decide on almost every issue in the school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Ineffective monitoring.</strong> Principals or supervisors do not monitor effectively teachers’ performances at every school. Principals’ capacities to sanction teachers are limited to several cases: for instance they cannot fire them and they could face retaliation from unions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Ineffective, unclear and excessive regulation.</strong> Complicated procedures for administrative audits make difficult the monitoring of performance, especially because deadlines for inputs like textbooks cannot be modified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Lack of participatory policies.</strong> Decisions taken by a single official fosters corrupt practices. Lack of citizen committees or external observers increases discretion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Lack of standards and regulation.</strong> Lack of clear technical standards allows hiring teachers without any meritocratic process. Absence of basic standards make difficult the evaluation or monitoring of teachers’ or supervisors’ performances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Impunity.</strong> Denouncing corruption would mean staying out of the educational system for several years, which is the main provider of jobs in this area. Corrupt public officials are aware of this and that increases their decision power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <strong>Political coalitions and collusions.</strong> Political negotiations through unions frequently grant additional power to teachers or principals, without specific controls.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15. Examples of factors associated to “accountability” conditions on described corrupt practices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Collusion with principals and supervisors.</strong> Collusion between teachers and principals makes almost impossible the sanctioning of any malpractice among teachers. Dispersion of schools as well as limited access to communication with central authorities increases the power of officials at the lower level of the system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Excessive regulation.</strong> Limited access to information from education agencies, especially on the criterions and processes for allocation of contracts reduces accountability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Impunity.</strong> Denouncing corruption is not necessarily followed by investigations or sanctions, as described by Hardjono and Teggeman (2002).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Dispersion of schools.</strong> The distribution of schools across countries makes difficult to create adequate communication systems to inform the population on specific requirements and administrative procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Lack of transparency.</strong> Limited access to information from education agencies, especially on the criteria and processes of hiring and promotion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <strong>Parent’s lack of voice.</strong> Limited participation of parents due to ineffective formal regulations and lack of agency among the poorest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <strong>Collective action.</strong> Usually the main beneficiaries (parents and students) are disorganized and have a limited participation. On the other hand, teachers’ unions, which benefit from the lack of collective action by parents, are organized and effectively demand and obtain prerogatives in detriment of students’ rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. <strong>Ineffective monitoring.</strong> Complicated procedures for administrative audits make difficult the monitoring of public official’s performance, especially because deadlines for printing textbooks cannot be modified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the information provided in the reviewed literature on the three different components, it is possible to identify key aspects that could be used as guiding factors in the implementation of anti-corruption policies in education:

- There are economic and administrative conditions creating monopolies and economic conditions which might be the most difficult barriers (for instance, a limited number of schools or the limitation of enrolling children in private schools) because these conditions may require expensive interventions. However, there are administrative decisions that could be transformed (although some might be politically sensitive), like in the case of the creation of participatory councils or simplifying the teachers' certification process. The last set of conditions seems a promising area for implementing reforms.

- Regarding the agents' discretion, the literature identifies the main problem as the complexity of the legal regulation and the consequent impunity. This is associated with ineffective regulation and opaque distribution of faculties, as well as to frequent impunity. Besides the transformation of administrative regulation, the literature would suggest that it is necessary to open new communication channels with higher authorities and publicize criteria and decisions applied by public officials.

- Finally, the factors associated with accountability are closely related to the characteristics described in the previous components. Openness
and the possibility to reconvene actions from public officials are key aspects to reducing the prevalence of corruption.

The effectiveness of most of the interventions suggested in the literature has to be proved in different contexts, but it seems that because of the complexity of corruption, it is necessary to implement comprehensive interventions that do not consider only changes in formal regulations (as suggested by a revisionist current) but also deals with informal rules, personal values and beliefs (as suggested by a moralist perspective).

Early research of corruption was conducted by scholars representing a moralistic approach that relied more on the study of individual behavior than on the analysis of social institutions. Dissatisfaction with this approach promoted the emergence of a revisionist current for studying corruption, which assumed that scientific methods should be used in the study of corruption instead of moral perceptions and ethical codes. The revisionist approach had two main contributions: the use of a “rational” method in the research of corruption, and the argument that corruption should not be condemned a priori as a negative condition for developing countries, or at least not without making several considerations regarding the viability of their political systems, a position that was later discarded by recent research.

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36 A typical example of the critiques to the moralistic approach by revisionist proponents is found in Brabianti’s (1962), “Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption.” In this essay, Brabianti considers the moralistic approach appeal to “platitudinous injunctions” to explain the origin and existence of corruption with moral statements, reflecting a “permanent ambiguity and an auto-narcotic effect.” Leys (1964) contributed also to the criticism of the moralistic approach, mentioning that Wraith and Simpkins “display a militant ignorance of sociological theory and research, which may be partly a consequence of their reluctance to abandon their ethical absolutism” (Leys, 1964, p.217).

37 The idea behind the revisionist approach was that enough evidence would support the fact that corruption had positive effects for countries, mainly for its capacity to redistribute power and promote
It is clear that the research of corruption has evolved into a more complex field. Although some of the discussions reported at the middle of the last century were still based on an ideological debate rather than on specific interventions to reduce corruption, it is also helpful to understand the relevance of those questions already addressed and identify possible areas where more knowledge is currently needed.

IV. Final Comments.

The urgency for improving effectiveness in the administration of educational systems demands the study of any situation that may be a barrier or challenge to achieving an equal distribution of educational opportunities, including of course those created by inefficiencies as a result of goal displacements and misaligned organizational cultures. However, studying corrupt practices in education systems is a complex challenge, not just because of the limited information, but also because of the complexity associated with evaluating the performance of educational agencies (long term results, multiplicity of goals, and the political contexts associated with any evaluation in this sector).

This paper reviewed the limited literature on educational corruption. It described the main characteristics of corrupt practices studied from several perspectives, organized practices and findings, suggested plausible effects and provided some models for understanding the dimensions of educational corruption, particularly in developing countries. Also, this literature tried to identify knowledge negotiations among social groups that otherwise would have been isolated from the political system. Several authors would defend this position, as the definitions of corruption presented by them would demonstrate. Corruption was defined as the "welcome lubricant easing the path to modernization" (Huntington, 1968), as "a bridge, between those who hold political power and those who control wealth, to assimilate each other" (McMullan, 1961), or "a cement, fasten[ing] otherwise separate and conflict elements" (Leys, 1965).
gaps and suggest questions for future research. Finally, it described policy implications based on the limited information available, explaining some common aspects that may help to inform not just future research but the design and implementation of policies.

Fighting corruption in education must be considered a necessary step for reforming educational systems to achieve better conditions of equity and quality, given that corrupt practices observed at the school level may have a different impact than practices observed at the central level. As Merilee Grindle (2004) points out, the scarcity of resources creates a more compelling circumstance to identify ways in which to improve the quality of education without increasing expenditure.

Developing countries depend on their capacities to successfully implement reforms with the aim of improving accountability systems and increasing transparency levels in their education systems, given their need for reducing social inequalities, increasing economic development, and institutionalizing democratic systems. Even though the effects of corruption are difficult to be measured, inefficient education systems in Latin America might be linked to prevailing issues of social inequalities. We must consider corruption as a determinant factor in the limitation of institutional capacities to transform our education systems. Thus, research on this phenomenon is required to guide future interventions. Furthermore, we should remember that schools are a natural setting for social transformation. Fighting corruption in education systems should be a priority because schools are still the main existent institutions for the transformation of political cultures and the elimination of societal malpractices.
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Appendix One. Readings on corruption in education (2005)


Appendix One. Readings on corruption in education (2005). Continued (2)…


### Appendix One. Readings on corruption in education (2005). Continued (3)...


